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ABSTRACT 
The importance of water is difficult to quantify, but because it is 
necessary for survival, it deserves recognition as a human right.  Although 
the right to water has received considerable attention, it has not yet achieved 
the status of customary international law. 
Amy Hardberger’s article analyzes the consequences for governments 
if the human right to water becomes an accepted norm of international law. 
The article expands the traditional notion that a human right is enforceable 
by a citizen against her government by investigating intra-governmental 
responsibilities in different contexts, including times of peace and more 
complicated relationships, such as those created in times of conflict or 
belligerent occupation. Finally, the article examines available enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure the obligations, once established, are met. 
If the right to water becomes a human right, the author argues, 
governments may have a responsibility to provide water beyond their 
borders. A state unable to meet its needs could demand assistance from a 
neighbor, especially in situations involving economic inequities or shared 
water resources.  During conflict, governments would be prohibited from 
damaging water resources.  After conflict, the belligerent would be required 
to protect and fulfill the water needs of the occupied state.  Enforcement of 
these obligations could be achieved at the national or international level, or 
by horizontal enforcement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of water is difficult to quantify.  Put most simply, it is necessary for 
the survival of all life on earth.  Beyond drinking, it is used for cooking, hygiene, 
agricultural and livestock purposes.1  Some societies also use water for religious 
ceremonies, exercise, diversion, and even aesthetics.2  Because of its life giving and 
sustaining capabilities, it is difficult to imagine a substance more deserving of the 
designation of “human right.”  This need for water to become a protected right becomes 
more pronounced when one realizes the percentage of people who do not have access to 
sufficient quantities of water.3  Despite its importance, very few international instruments 
recognize water as a human right. 
Early human rights were written in general terms and did not explicitly define all 
possible implied rights.  One of the basic rights represented in the initial human rights 
documents was the right to life.4 The right to life was originally read narrowly and did not 
include basic life necessities.5  The right to life is now read more broadly to include the 
prevention of murder, war time atrocities and measures that increase life expectancy like 
personal health and hygiene.6 
Early proponents of the right to water sought to include it as naturally implicit in the 
right to life.7  More recently, groups have endeavored to establish water as a separate and 
individual right of citizens.8  Although the awareness regarding the human right to water 
1. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 6 (2003), available at http://www.who.int/ 
water_sanitation_health/en/rtwrev.pdf [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO WATER]. 
2. Id. 
3. Over one billion of the world’s more than six billion people do not have available sources of clean water 
for drinking. Id. at 7. Nearly two billion additional people who have access to water for basic survival do not have 
enough for sufficient health and hygiene to successfully combat disease.  Id.; Peter Gleick, The Human Right to 
Water, at 2 (1999), available at http://www.thewaterpage.com/Human%20Right.pdf, reprinted in 1(5) WATER 
POL’Y 487–503. 
4. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
5. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS 734 (2d ed. 2000). 
6. Id.  This broad interpretation was expressed in General Comment No. 6 to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which noted that the right to life “cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner” 
and should include “measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy.”  International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 6: the Right to Life (art. 6), UN ESCOR Human Rights 
Commission, 16th Sess., International Human Rights Instruments, art. 5 (April 30, 1982), UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3? 
Opendocument. 
7. See John Scanlon et al., Water as a Human Right 18–19 (IUCN ENVT’L POL’Y & L. PAPER NO. 51, 2004), 
available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/EPLP51EN.pdf (explaining that if the right to water is 
not a recognized fundamental right, it is nevertheless an implicit component of other rights). 
8. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 
14(2)(h), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (1979), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article14; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 annex, art. 24 (2)(c), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/44/49 (1989). 
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has increased in recent times, the inclusion of water within the right to life or water as a 
stand alone right has not yet become customary international law.9 
Once water has been established as a right, the parameters of that right must be 
defined. Reviewing existing right-to-water documents and recommendations, access is 
required at a minimum.10  The state must protect against any threat to existing water sources 
and must create a source if none is available.11 The minimum requirement imposed on 
states by the human right to water is a “sufficient supply of safe drinking water to sustain 
life.”12  For greatest protection, states should use liberal estimates for their climate to ensure 
basic needs are being met.13  The total amount of water required per capita per day is 
dependent on local conditions and priority of usage.14 All water supplied or accessed must 
be of an acceptable quality to protect public health.15 
The human right to water is ineffective in a vacuum. To function properly, someone 
must be entitled to demand water, and someone must be obligated to provide it, once the 
right to water has been established and defined.  Although human rights discussions are 
generally limited to the confines of a local government and its people, as water needs 
increase so will the situations implicating the need.  This article is a progressive analysis of 
governmental obligations created if the human right to water becomes international law.  Of 
the many relationships existing between states, the relatively simple relationship visualized 
between a government and its citizens is rare.  This discussion is an extension to the 
dialogue about the human right to water in a local context.16 
Part II provides a basic review of human rights, its major advances, and the treatment 
of human rights in international law.17 This section also chronicles the historic introduction 
of water becoming an individual human right.18 Understanding the basics of human rights 
law and its evolution is critical in recognizing the mechanisms available to develop water as 
a human right as well as visualizing how human rights law can be applied to provide water 
for people in need.19 
Part III expands on the traditional notion that a human right is enforceable by a citizen 
against her government by investigating governmental responsibilities in a range of 
9. Compare Scanlon et al., supra note 7, at 51 (stating that the right to water has not been clearly defined in 
international law) with  SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
WATER, at ix (2004) (explaining that a human right to water exists because it is included in other recognized 
rights). 
10.  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3. See U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to 
Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), at para. 2, U.N. 
GAOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cult. Rights, 29th Sess., 27 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter, 
ICESCR Comment 15]; H.R. Con. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Arts. 11 and 12]; Scanlon, supra note 
7, at 2. 
11. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, arts. 11–12, para. 2. 
12. Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1992). 
13. See  GUY HOWARD & JAMIE BARTRAM, WORLD HEALTH ORG., DOMESTIC WATER QUANTITY, SERVICE 
LEVEL AND HEALTH 22–23, WHO/SDE/WSH/03.02 (2003), available at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_ 
health/diseases/en/WSH0302.pdf. 
14. See id. at Executive Summary. 
15. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, at arts. 11–12 & n.15. 
16. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and 
the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v4/n2/3. 
17. See discussion infra Part II. 
18. See discussion infra Part II. 
19. See discussion infra Part II. 
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situations.20 This section evaluates a variety of relationships that can exist between states, 
starting with times of peace where economic disparity or a shared water resource exists and 
moving to more complicated relationships such as those created in times of conflict or by a 
belligerent occupier.21  Each of these situations is then illustrated by a case study in an 
attempt to demonstrate how these ideas could be applied in a real-world setting.22  Finally 
Part IV takes a brief look at the available enforcement mechanisms that exist to ensure the 
obligations, once established, are met.23  The conclusion indicates the need for further 
evaluation in this area and proposes how this discussion could be expanded further to 
include the obligations of citizens to one another and the relationship between the citizens 
of one state and the government of another. 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
“Human rights are protected by internationally guaranteed standards that ensure the 
fundamental freedoms and dignity of individuals and communities.”24  These rights are 
generally held by citizens and enforceable against the state.25  Human rights are considered 
universal; they encompass a range of civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights.26 
Human rights are sometimes codified into a government document such as the 
provisions and obligations included in international treaties.27  An international treaty can 
be binding on a country in one of two ways. Ratification is an affirmative step reflecting a 
state’s consent and intent to be bound.28  A signature can construe consent, but a more 
authoritative act is usually required.29  Ratification, in whatever form it takes in a particular 
government, is the most common method of treaty adoption.30 
International law does not require a country to agree upon an idea for it to be bound.31 
More frequently, rights are unwritten and function as implicit requirements of society.32 
20. See discussion infra Part III. 
21. See discussion infra Part III. 
22. See discussion infra Parts III.A.3, B. 
23. See discussion infra Part IV. 
24. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 7.  The concept of human rights was not common terminology 
until as recently as  after World War II. J. Roland Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Rights—A 
General View, in XXIII HUMAN RIGHTS NOMOS 1, 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981). 
Although many human rights can be related back to natural law, the motivation to codify these protections was to 
avoid future atrocities like those that occurred in Germany and later in Vietnam. Id. at 1, 4. 
25. See THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 7. 
26. Id.; MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?, at 7 (1973). 
27. See generally id. at 1–7.  For a sampling of such documents in early American history, see VIRGINIA BILL 
OF RIGHTS para. 1 (1776), available at http://www.constitution.org/bor/vir_bor.htm.  This early Bill of Rights 
included the proclamation “that all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights . . . namely the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness.”  Id. Similar language was later seen in the United States Declaration of 
Independence; however, the United States Constitution does not provide for basic human needs.  THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), available at http://archives.gov/historical-docs/doc-
content/images/declaration-of-independence.pdf (declaring that “[all men] are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”).  The U.S. 
Constitution, however, does not include a provision guaranteeing basic human rights.  Ann I. Park, Human Rights 
and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1195, 1196 (1987). 
28. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582–83 (6th ed. 2003). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. The United States Constitution requires the ratification of treaties by senate and congressional 
approval to make the treaty binding on U.S. citizens.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Constitution also requires that 
“[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 
Id. art. VI. 
31. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 6. 
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Non-party states can be bound by a provision in an international treaty if it rises to the level 
of customary law.33  Once this level of law has been realized, it can be binding on all states 
whether or not they contributed to its formation.34  The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties expands this by stating that “[i]f a new peremptory norm or general international 
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates.”35  These norms are referred to as jus cogens.36 
Establishing water as a human right is a changing process finding its foundation in a 
dependent human rights past and seeking an independent future.  The impact and 
obligations created by the human right to water depends on whether water will be implicitly 
included in other human rights or recognized as a stand alone right. 
The categorization of a right as positive or negative also determines the governmental 
duties imposed and defines whether a state must take affirmative steps to provide the right, 
or to simply guard against its deprivation.  Human rights fall into two distinct categories. 
First, welfare rights are defined as rights which assure the provision of certain goods or 
services considered necessary for human well-being.37 Welfare rights include economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  They are considered a positive right because they require 
affirmative action by governments to create the right for their citizens.38  Positive rights are 
the easiest to enforce because the state has recognized their existence and enforcement is 
often included in local law.39 
In contrast, liberty rights, which include the right not to be interfered with or 
maltreated, are generally secured through ensuring noninterference with the right.40  Liberty 
rights include civil and political rights.  These rights are often unwritten moral rights, 
which exist as implicit requirements of society, making enforcement much more difficult.41 
When a government does not explicitly recognize the rights of its citizens, international law 
can provide a means to require their protection; however, this may not be the most efficient 
method of securing a right as important as water. 
32. CRANSTON, supra note 26, at 5–6 (categorizing these types of rights as “moral rights”). 
33. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 6. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4.  The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) applies international law to solve disputes set before it.  Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J., art. 38, para. 1, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.  The sources of international law that are binding 
within the court include: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
Id. In order for the ICJ to hear disputes, a state must first accept its jurisdiction.  The International Court of Justice: 
General Information, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html.  There are two 
requirements which evidence general acceptance: (1) state practice must be shown to be consistent with a rule; and 
(2) states must conform to a rule due to a sense of legal obligation or opinio juris. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 6– 
12. 
34. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 6. 
35. United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties Signed at Vienna, May 23, 1969, art. 64, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.law.of.treaties. 
convention.1969/doc. 
36. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 488–90; see Vienna Convention art. 64. 
37. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 8. 
38. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 24. 
39. CRANSTON, supra note 26, at 5. 
40. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 8; SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 24. 
41. CRANSTON, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
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To ensure maximum benefits and enforcement mechanisms for citizens, early 
discussions focused on whether water is currently included in existing rights or if it should 
be developed as an independent human right.42  Although global recognition of the need to 
ensure access to water is increasing, it has not reached the level of customary international 
law as an independent right.43  This issue aside, great strides have been made in the global 
recognition of the basic right to water and the need to ensure widespread access; however, 
more work must be done. 
Simply assuming that water is included in an existing human right will not create the 
recognition necessary to help people in need of the resource.44  The critical role of water in 
the daily life of the world’s population raises its importance beyond academic conjecture 
into action.  Past environmental movements have demonstrated that shining a light directly 
on an issue is often the best way to bring it out of the shadows.45  Providing rules and 
creating accountability through enforcement mechanisms is often the only way to ensure 
change. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) expressed it well 
when it stated, “[f]ormally acknowledging water as a human right, and expressing the 
willingness to give content and effect to this right, may be a way of encouraging the 
international community and governments to enhance their efforts to satisfy basic human 
needs . . . .”46 Although reference to and the attempted inclusion of water as a human right 
has increased awareness in the international community, it has not yet reached the objective 
level of customary international law.47 
The first human rights treaty to explicitly mention the right to water was the 1979 
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
It obligates states to “take all appropriate measures . . . [to] ensure” the right “to enjoy 
adequate living conditions particularly in relation to . . . water supply.”48 A second, equally 
important document was the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered 
into force in September 1990.  The preamble to this document recognized that “childhood 
is entitled to special care and assistance . . . [and] children should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance . . . .”49 To achieve these ends, states are to ensure, among other 
things, that an infrastructure exists to provide an accepted standard of health care.50  A 
familiar edict is found in Article 6: “[s]tates Parties recognize that every child has the 
inherent right to life.”51 
Perhaps the greatest victories to date for those seeking to establish water as a human 
right were the 2000 and 2002 General Comments to United Nations Committee on 
42. Perhaps the most prominent human right linked to water, is the right to life. Proponents argue that the 
right to life should be read more broadly to include the pursuit of policy and legislation to support those means as 
well as the more traditional protection against arbitrary deprivation of rights.  If these treaties and agreements are 
interpreted more proactively, a government’s inaction in building water systems or otherwise interfering with the 
delivery of water to its people would violate the right to life. See Hardberger, supra note 16, at 340. 
43. See id. at 333. 
44. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 1; Hardberger, supra note 16, at 340. 
45. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing the Rio Earth Summit as an example of how academic 
discussions can raise excitement but not necessarily ensure implementation without sufficient governance 
arrangements).  An example of a successful world-wide sustainability effort is the ozone depletion crisis in the late 
1980s. See U.N. Development Programme, The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Development 
Programme, http://www.undp.org/montrealprotocol/montreal.htm (last visited May 23, 2006).  Joint agreements 
such as the Montreal Protocol, formed as a result of scientific data and media attention, created widespread 
participation to reduce ozone depleting gases in the atmosphere. Id. 
46. Scanlon, supra note 7, at 1. 
47. Contra SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at ix. 
48. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 8, art. 
14(2)(h). 
49. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 8, pmbl. 
50. Id. art. 24. 
51. Id. art. 6(1). 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.52  The specific enumeration of water in General 
Comments 14 and 15 bestowed a right to the effort that previously existed only by 
implication. 
Though not binding, Comment 15 has several important impacts.53  First, it creates 
strong support for water as a human right by explicitly incorporating it into the ICESCR 
and recognizing its existence in other documents such as CEDAW.  Second, because of its 
level of detail, the Comment commands “considerable state responsibility and action” by 
extending the requirement beyond drinking water to include other uses.54  Perhaps most 
importantly, in addition to defining who has the obligation, the Comment takes a major step 
towards defining the extent of the right regarding quantity, quality, and accessibility.55 
These documents create a solid base for establishing the right to water. 
Several governments have sought to include the right to basic needs among their state 
policies.56 In addition, human rights have been extensively recognized through 
international documents or treaties similar to those described above.57  South Africa is one 
of a handful of countries to include the human right to water in the rights afforded to all 
citizens.58  This right has been enforced by legislation and court decisions.59  Local efforts 
and UN documents have increased recognition that the right to water needs to be 
established; however, more work still remains to accomplish this goal. 
Establishing water as a separate human right would be significant, but many questions 
would still remain.  Assuming it reaches this status, its mere presence as a right provides 
little guidance regarding the behavior it seeks to require.  Official and unofficial documents 
have attempted to define the right to water by listing specific expectations with little 
consistency.  An additional obstacle to understanding the right to water is the frequently 
seen caveat conditioning requirements on local situations.60  Although this provides a more 
flexible standard, it may also provide an avenue for states to evade requirements by 
claiming circumstantial limitations. 
Reviewing existing right-to-water documents and recommendations, states are 
required to provide access at a minimum.61  This must be done in a non-discriminatory 
52. See The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) para. 4, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 
(2000) [hereinafter ICESCR Comment 14]; ICESCR Comment 15. 
53. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 5. 
54. Id. at 65. 
55. Id. 
56. Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights,” in XXIII HUMAN RIGHTS NOMOS XXIII 257, 
258–60 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981).  Many national laws were considered to be deficient 
in paving the way for international human rights; however, in other locations international regulations mirror that 
of local law. Id. at 259. 
57. Id. at 258–60.  The international human rights movement encourages countries to include these 
obligations in their legal construct or, in the alternative, provides basic rights for people when those protected 
locally are insufficient.  Id. at 259. 
58. The Gambia, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Uganda also include constitutional provisions ensuring the right to 
clean water for their citizens.  See The Right to Water, National Legislation on the Right to Water, 
http://www.righttowater.org.uk/code/Legislation_2.asp (last visited May 23, 2006); see S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 § 27. 
59. See Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. S. Metro. Local Council (2002) (6) BCLR 625 (W); Water 
Services Act, Act 108 of 1997 s. 3 (S. Afr.).  In India, water is not an explicit right listed in the Constitution; 
however, courts at the state and federal levels have interpreted the constitutional right to life to include the right to 
safe and sufficient water.  The Right to Water, Legal Redress: The Right to Water Under the Right to Life: India, 
http://www.righttowater.org.uk/code/legal_3.asp (last visited May 23, 2006). 
60. See, e.g., ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 17. 
61. Hardberger, supra note 16, at 346–53 (providing a detailed discussion of what is included in the right to 
water). See ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 2; H.R. Con. Res. 468, supra note 10, at 2. 
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manner and may entail positive and negative requirements.62  The state must protect against 
any threat to existing water sources and must create a source if none is available.63  If the 
state has the economic capacity to deliver water, they must do so.  All water must be 
affordable to be accessible.64  This limits the price that can be charged for water delivery 
and likely imposes a prohibition on discontinuation of service for economic reasons.65 
Types of use for the water must also be established.  On a very basic level, a state’s 
obligation is to ensure the sustainability of water for its people.66  Any right to water would 
include drinking water; however, other included uses are less clear.67  In addition to 
drinking, water is also required for human hygiene, sanitation services, and food 
preparation.68 The quantity needed for hygienic purposes is variable, depending on 
included uses, technology, and local resources.69  A tiered approach prioritizes use and 
provides governments with a structure to guide them in creating a strategy to supply water 
for their citizens.  In this scheme, sufficient drinking and cooking water is the first goal; 
water for sanitation and hygiene is the next; and agricultural, industrial, and environmental 
water is the final obligation provided that the previous goals have been met.70 
Establishing the uses of water included in the human right to water is an important 
step in the development of the right, but the water must be quantified to be most useful to 
states. Water needs vary according to many factors including climate, lifestyle, diet, and 
wealth, but some minimum requirement must be established for human rights purposes.71 
A lack of a water supply is a violation of the human right to water, but an expectation of 
unlimited access is unrealistic; therefore, the requirement must be a compromise between 
these two theories. 72 
Applying the different theories of what should be included in the human right to water 
yields a range of total daily water needs.  The survival analysis estimates average needs at 
fifty liters per person per day.73  In contrast, South Africa’s compulsory national standard is 
only twenty-five liters per person per day. 74  It is unclear which uses are included in that 
amount; however if it based on the water obligation contained in the South African 
Constitution, it includes drinking water and basic sanitation.75  The WHO’s domestic-use 
projection is even lower estimating five to 7.5 liters per capita per day depending on the 
user.76 This basic access estimate is significantly lower because it only includes basic 
62. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 12(c). 
63. See id. para. 10. 
64. Id. para. 2. 
65. See id. para. 24; The Right to Water, Legal Redress: The Right to Water Under the Right to Life: South 
Africa, http://www.righttowater.org.uk/code/legal_2.asp. 
66. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 15. 
67. See id. at 12. 
68. Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, 21 WATER INT’L 
83, 83 (1996). This appears most similar to the tact taken by Comment No. 15 requiring states to provide “access 
to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal land domestic uses to prevent 
disease.” ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 37(a). 
69. Gleick, supra note 68, at 85–86, 87–88. 
70. See Howard, supra note 13, at 23. 
71. Gleick, supra note 68, at 83. 
72. See Gleick, supra note 3, at 8. 
73. Gleick, supra note 68, at 83. This figure includes five liters per day for drinking, twenty liters for 
sanitation and hygiene, fifteen liters for bathing, and ten liters per day for cooking.  Id. at 88. 
74. Michael Kidd, Not a Drop to Drink: Disconnection of Water Services for Non-Payment and the Right to 
Access of Water, 20 S. AFRICAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 119, 122 (2004). 
75. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 § 27.  This number has received criticism as inadequate for sanitation needs. 
Kidd, supra note 74, at 134. 
76. Howard & Bartman, supra note 13, at 9. This estimate only reserves two liters for cooking and the 
remaining water is for drinking. Id.  The higher estimate compensates for the increased water required by lactating 
mothers. Id. 
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hydration and cooking needs.77  Including hygiene would increase this number from five to 
one hundred liters per capita per day depending on the location of the water source and the 
goals of usage.78  Although hygiene is not part of the minimum human needs, due to its 
importance for health, a minimum allowance for sanitation should be included in the human 
right to water.79 
Providing low-quality water would vitiate the fundamental rationale that undergirds 
the right to water.  Any quantity of water is meaningless if its quality causes it to be unfit 
for use or consumption.80  Therefore, the minimum requirement imposed on states by the 
human right to water is a “sufficient supply of safe drinking water to sustain life.”81  As the 
obligations created by the right to water are further understood, the right itself will be 
clarified until its consistent and absolute nature raises it to the level of customary 
international law empowering citizens to demand fulfillment of their survival needs. 
III. A GOVERNMENT’S OBLIGATIONS TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS 
Many organizations believe that “[g]overnments hold the primary responsibility for 
ensuring the realization of human rights.”82  The issue is determining how far this 
responsibility extends.  Human rights are usually defined as rights held by citizens against 
their state; therefore, evaluating a government’s responsibility to its neighbor does not fit 
easily into the human rights construct.83  However, “[s]ince many countries lack the 
wherewithal to provide safe drinking water for their populations, it seems essential that the 
international community take a proactive approach to the prevention of foreseeable 
problems of this kind and to dealing with natural disasters such as droughts.”84 
As we move towards economic globalization, a water crisis in one area can have 
consequences that extend outside physical borders.85  Therefore, if the parent government 
does not have the ability to satisfy the rights of their citizens, other states must help.86 
Although international law provides minimal on-point instruction regarding these 
situations, guidance can be gleaned from existing laws to define the responsibilities states 
hold toward their neighbors in times of peace or conflict. 
77. Id. at 9. The cooking estimate is also much lower because it is based on the minimum amount of water 
used to cook rice, whereas the survival estimate is an average of cooking needs in developed and developing 
countries. Id.; Gleick, supra note 68, at 84, tbl.3. 
78. Howard & Bartram, supra note 13, at 23. 
79. Gleick, supra note 3, at 9. 
80. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 16. 
81. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 12. 
82. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 28. 
83. See, e.g., id. at 7.  Although, the primary obligations created by the human right to water are between a 
government and its citizens, this topic has been thoroughly explored elsewhere and does not need to be repeated 
here. See Hardberger, supra note 16, at 333–40. 
84. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 16. 
85. See Jim Shultz, Economic Globalization vs. Human Rights: Lessons from the Bolivian Water Revolt, 
INDIA RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 20, 2003), available at http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/water/ 
2003.lessonsfrombolivia.html (explaining the conflict that occurred when Bolivia privatized water resources 
because the government could not afford to maintain the utility and water quickly became unaffordable for many 
individuals). 
86. See id. (pointing out that the economic hardship of the Bolivian government forced a choice between 
complying with international economic institutions or protecting the human rights of their citizens). 
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A. Neighboring States 
It is generally assumed that each government is responsible for maintaining the rights 
and providing for the needs of its own citizens.  However, if a country does not have the 
resources to accomplish this task, this responsibility may shift and create a duty for other 
countries to assist.  This duty can be heightened if the neighboring country has significantly 
fewer resources or if the two countries share a water resource.  Although many surface 
water sources are allocated by treaties, they are frequently not adhered to, and often no 
official binational agreement exists to dictate groundwater allocation.87  Without providing 
specific instruction, international law such as Comment 15 provides direction concerning 
water responsibilities between states. 
First and foremost, Comment 15 requires “international cooperation and assistance 
[to] take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to water.”88 
Because of its broad language, this could create significant implications for neighboring 
states. The phrase “joint action” implies that if one state is not able to achieve its goals by 
separate action, the assistance of another state may be required.89  Subsequent articles of 
Comment 15 clarify this duty by prohibiting interference with another state’s water supply 
through embargo or other political means.90  Additionally, paragraph 34 applies more 
directly to these issues by requiring assistance for the realization of the right of water in 
other countries.91 The article specifically lists technical assistance, financial assistance, 
and, most importantly, the “provision of water resources.”92 
The dictate to aid is contingent on the availability of resources.93  Presumably the 
article would not require a state to provide resources that are needed by its citizens, but 
would call for a contribution if an excess existed.94  States are also encouraged to consider 
the right to water and its allocation when creating bilateral and multilateral agreements or 
developing treaties exclusively for those purposes.95  The rules provided by Comment 15 
outline general obligations among countries; however, more specific requirements are best 
understood by examining specific circumstances or locations. 
1. Shared Watercourse 
It is not unusual for a fresh water resource, either ground water or surface water, to be 
shared by two or more states.  In fact, international drainage basins make up approximately 
forty-seven percent of the earth’s land area.96 With so many shared water resources, it is 
87. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities for Managing 
Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341, 363–77 (2000) (discussing 
the lack of a groundwater agreement along the U.S.-Mexico border for any of the seventeen existing aquifers). 
88. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 30 (applying Article 2 of the ICESCR, which requires that 
assistance be provided to other states to assure the realization of rights to water). 
89. Id. para. 30. 
90. Id. paras. 31–36. 
91. Id. para. 34. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 34. 
95. Id. para. 35. 
96. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining that most of these shared waters exist in Africa and Latin 
America).  This statistic does not include the freshwater found in Antarctica. Id. One example of an international 
drainage basin is the U.S.-Mexico border, which, as referenced above, shares seventeen known aquifers as well as 
the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers.  Mumme, supra note 87, at 363–77.  Another example is the Guarani aquifer, 
one of the largest groundwater reservoirs.  It is shared by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Michela 
Miletto & Roberto Kirchheim, The Invisible Resource Transboundary Aquifers: An Opportunity for International 
Cooperation, O.A.S. POL’Y SERIES NO. 3 (2004), available at http://www.oas.org/dsd/policy_series/ 3_eng.pdf. 
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important to understand the responsibility of one country to provide necessary water for a 
neighboring country, especially when the latter does not have the resources to provide for 
itself. 
International documents, designed to dictate shared resource usage, provide general 
water duties between countries that can be applied in a human rights context.  The 
Watercourse Convention, the International Law Association’s Helsinki Rules, and its 
subsequent updates discuss basic responsibilities that states have. These duties would only 
be amplified by the human right to water.  Although the physical characteristics of the 
water source can dictate the ways the rules are applied, some norms can be established. 
International law has generally provided that states have the right to exploit their own 
resources, but have the responsibility not to do so with other states’ resources.97  The  
custom regarding shared resource situations has often resulted in one state attempting to 
gain control of the supply for the purpose of obtaining power over the other state.98 
Because water has unique implications, it is important that states avoid trying to “increase 
the power gap” by controlling the resource, and that they start cooperating with the sharing 
state.99  A government must balance the needs of its domestic groups as well as the other 
state’s interest.100 
Fresh water resources can be shared in a number of different ways.101  The Helsinki 
Rules and the Watercourse Convention require “equitable utilization” of the shared water 
source, stating that each state was entitled to an “equitable and reasonable utilization” of 
the water.102  The documents do not define “equitable and reasonable utilization” and 
instead recommend decisions be made on a case-by-case basis by taking “into account all 
relevant factors.”103 In practice, equitable utilization means that a user can utilize a 
resource so long as it does not harm another user who is using the resource equitably.104 
Equitable does not necessarily mean equal.105  One solution would be to only allow a 
state access to the quantity of water directly beneath it, but this may not be the best solution 
depending on other surrounding circumstances.106  Consideration of many factors seeks to 
Many shared water resources are currently governed by bilateral or multilateral treaties; however, this is less 
common in areas where water shortages are more critical.  Stephen C. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 18. 
97. See G.A. Res. 2995 art. 42, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/2995 (Dec. 15, 1972), available at 
http://ods-dds.ny.un.org/doc.  The obligations imposed by the human right to water are not intended to prevail over 
sovereignty rights; however, a state’s ownership of resources must yield to the prevention of harm to another state. 
Tony Allan, Avoiding War Over Natural Resources: Extract from Forum: Water and War (Nov. 1, 1998), available 
at http://www.icrc.org. 
98. Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of 
International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L LAW 384, 393 (1996). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. See Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water 
Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 235–248 (2003) (describing six models of shared 
water and possible impacts of one state’s use on a neighboring state). 
102. Int’l Law Ass’n, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ch. 2, art. IV 
(1967) [hereinafter The Helsinki Rules], available at  http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org. 
103. Id. art. V.  Although “equitable share” is not defined, both the Helsinki Rules and the Watercourse 
Convention provide a list of factors that should be considered to assist in its determination. Id.;  Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, at art. 6(1), U.N. GAOR, 51st 
Sess., U.N.Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares51/ga51-
229.htm [hereinafter Watercourses Convention]. 
104. Itzchak E. Kornfield, A Water Solution for the Middle East Conflict, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10207 (2003). 
105. See The Helsinki Rules, supra note 102, arts. IV–VIII. 
106. See Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater, 31 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 167, 177–78 (1991). See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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create a balance between the states.107  The total benefits and detriments to a state are 
weighed to determine allocation quantities.108  Utilization is based on the individual needs 
of an area.109  This flexible and individual treatment of basins creates a framework to build 
a workable agreement.110 
Intrinsic in equitable utilization is the need for flexibility and cooperation of users.111 
Unfortunately, cooperation in past agreements has been used to widen the power gap, not 
maximize the resource.112  Because water is needed for survival, agreements should attempt 
to satisfy all of the participants’ long-term needs.113  At the United Nations Mar del Plata 
Conference, it was recommended that “countries sharing water resources . . . should review 
existing and available techniques for managing shared water resources and cooperate in the 
establishment of programs, machinery and institutions necessary for the coordinated 
development of such resources.”114 
A useful starting point for cooperation is the international law principle to avoid 
causing harm to another state.115  In the context of water, harm could occur by exploitation 
or pollution of a shared resource.116  The principle of “avoiding harm” has been echoed by 
many international treaties and is clearly enunciated in many U.N. resolutions, International 
Law Association (ILA) recommendations, and International Law Commission (ILC) 
rules.117  This goal can be accomplished through open communication between the nations 
and notification of withdrawals.118  Notice of water removal by one state allows the other 
state to object if harm will be caused so the water is used equitably.119 
The aforementioned discussion relates to obligations established under international 
law; however, Comment 15 lays similar groundwork for requirements between states under 
a human rights construct.  Article 31 of the Comment requires that “State[] parties have to 
107. See The Helsinki Rules, supra note 102. 
108. See Barberis, supra note 106, at 177. 
109. 5 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 37 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1998). 
110. See Albert E. Utton, International Water Quality Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 168– 
71 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974). 
111. Kornfield, supra note 104. 
112. See  EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL 
RESOURCE USE 43–44 (2002). 
113. See Benvenisti, supra note 98, at 399–400. 
114. Report of the United Nations Water Conference at 10, Mar del Plata, U.N. Doc.E/Conf.70/29, at 10 
(1977). 
115. See Barberis, supra note 106, at 169–70. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 170–71.  The ILA is a “major international nongovernmental organization devoted to 
international legal matters.”  Robert D. Hayton, The Law of International Aquifers, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 73 
(1982).  The ILA is responsible for some of the earliest efforts to address shared groundwater issues.  Eckstein & 
Eckstein, supra note 101, at 228. This has been accomplished through a series of conferences generating guidance 
rules, which are promulgated to be a fall-back for states that did not have their own rules.  Robert D. Hayton, The 
Law of International Aquifers, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 73 n.2 (1982).  The best known guidance rules created 
by the ILA are the 1967 Helsinki Rules, which were updated by the Seoul Conference of 1986, and the most recent 
Berlin Rules in 2004.  Because the ILA is a non-governmental organization that requires no public participation, 
any rules it creates by them are not considered binding international law. Melvin Woodhouse, Is Public 
Participation a Rule of the Law of International Watercourses?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 137, 175 (2003).  In 
contrast, the ILC is a group of elected members first assembled by the United Nations in 1947.  Stephen C. 
McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
139, 150 (1991).  In 1970, the United Nations directed the ILC to examine non-navigational uses of watercourses 
with the objective of codifying a progressive level of international law, which eventually resulted in the 
Watercourse Convention.  Hayton at 80.  The ILC’s guidance is slightly more binding because it is composed of 
member states.  Jordan C. Kahn, 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, 1997 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 178, 183 (1997). Articles will become 
binding on those states that choose to sign and ratify the Convention, which no state is required to do. Id.  Non-
signatory states may also be bound “if it [a given Article] represents customary international law.”  Id. 
118. See Barberis, supra note 106, at 177–79. 
119. See id. 
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respect the enjoyment of the right [to water] in other countries” and should “refrain from 
actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other 
countries.”120  This article indicates that a downstream riparian may have a human rights 
claim against an upstream riparian if the downstream user was denied use and enjoyment of 
the water.121 This potentially creates accountability between a state and individuals outside 
its jurisdiction.122 Although the comment does not specifically make this link, it should not 
be discounted when read with the other intentions of the comment.123 
The international articles of Comment 15 also refer to the duty of one country to assist 
in the realization of rights of another country, presuming that a sufficient supply is 
present.124  However, if a human rights claim for this issue cannot be made, an international 
law claim can. The Watercourse Convention does state that vital human needs are 
especially important in a shared watercourse situation.125  Therefore, enforcement may 
occur under this article if an upper riparian denies a lower riparian of water needed for 
survival to a lower riparian.126 
Under any legal construct, a true recognition of the human right to water should 
permit a citizen to bring a human rights claim against a neighboring state for deprivation of 
water.127  With these mechanisms of enforcement citizens are empowered to demand their 
water supply. 
2. Economic Disparity 
All countries do not have the same resources at their disposal.  Due to these 
differences, one country may have the economic means to provide water for their citizens 
while their neighbor within close geographic proximity cannot.  Money can affect regional 
access to water in many ways.  It can pay for drilling wells, infrastructure upkeep, 
technology for water treatment, and enhanced or artificial recharge.  Although the 
responsibility for water created by economic differences is a new discussion, subtle 
references found in international law serve as a basis for a dialogue. 
Economic needs are a consideration for equitable apportionment.  Article 6 of the 
Watercourse Convention includes social and economic needs of the state as a factor that 
should be considered in determining equitable and reasonable utilization.128  Because the 
poor suffer from the lack of sufficient water more than any other group,129 this factor could 
be significant in decisions regarding fair utilization. 
Comment 15 also links economics with the right to water.130  Article 15 states that 
poverty should not justify lack of services.131  Although the Comment focuses on 
120. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 31. 
121. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water Revisited, in WATER AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW (Edith Brown Weiss et al. eds., 2004). 
122. Id. 
123. Contra id. (arguing that because Comment 15 does not explicitly reference any obligation regarding 
individuals in other countries, it did not intend to create such obligations). 
124. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, paras. 30, 34. 
125. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 10. 
126. Id. 
127. See McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 20.  An analogy may be drawn to humanitarian law, which permits 
citizens of one state to enforce their rights against the government of another. 
128. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103. 
129. See THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 22. 
130. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 15. 
131. See id. 
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prohibiting a state from depriving an individual of water services, the idea behind the 
article is to create a special claim for those lacking sufficient means.132  Specific financial 
obligations between countries are created by the statement, “States should facilitate 
realization of the right water in other countries, for example through . . . financial and 
technical assistance, and provide the necessary aid when required.”133  Linking financial 
obligations to the international obligation to assist other states in the realization of all 
rights, more fortunate states should assist their less fortunate neighbors through technology 
transfer, utility assistance, or direct financial aid.134 
A similar idea was encouraged in General Comment 14 to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The comment placed responsibility on the parties 
to assist developing countries with the realization of their goals: “For the avoidance of any 
doubt, the Committee wishes to emphasize that it is particularly incumbent on States 
parties, and other actors in a position to assist, to provide international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical which enables developing countries to full 
their core obligations. . . .”135 
The shared approach to providing water is also supported by the concept that “global 
problems need global solutions.”136  “The lack of ‘extraterritoriality’ of human rights law is 
striking in today’s interdependent world, a world in which powerful states extend their 
influence, and affect individuals, in many other countries.”137  The lack of water in one area 
can negatively effect the sustainable development of neighboring states.138  Illustrations of 
these problems can be seen throughout the world, providing valuable information about 
what can be done and what should be avoided. 
3. The Case of the United States and Mexico 
Although water conflicts exist all over the world, the situation along the United 
States-Mexico border creates an ideal setting for discussing these issues and understanding 
the responsibilities of neighboring states.139 Potential water disputes between the United 
States and Mexico began with the succession of the southwest in 1848; any boundary 
agreement separating the land also separates the water.140  The United States and Mexico 
share at least seventeen groundwater aquifers and major surface water resources including 
the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers.141  Of these, only the surface water is governed by use 
agreements, and none of the aquifers are governed by a federal binational agreement.142 
Many of these water resources have the added complication of being shared by more than 
one state as well as by both nations.143 
132. Id. 
133. Id. para. 35. 
134. See id. paras. 15, 30–36; see THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that states should try to 
ensure sufficient financial and other aid is given to countries with limited resources). 
135. ICESCR Comment 14, supra note 52, at para. 45. 
136. Scanlon, supra note 7, at 24. 
137. McCaffrey, supra note 12. 
138. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 24. 
139. At present, the situation along the U.S.-Mexico border has not progressed to necessitate imposition of 
the obligations described in this and preceding sections; however, it provides an excellent example of potential 
interstate conflicts. 
140. G. Emlen Hall, Historical and Physical International Boundaries in Borderlands Water Conflicts: A 
Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 866 (2000). 
141. See Mumme, supra note 87, at 363–77. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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Water concerns have become more confusing as water needs along the border 
increase.144  The threat of a water crisis is particularly high due to the arid climate and 
increasing population.145  Population estimates of border counties reach as high as twelve 
million residents and predictions estimate that the number will double by 2020.146  With so 
many people needing water, the dwindling supply, due to an average annual precipitation of 
only 4.9 inches and frequent droughts, will result in increased water strain.147 
In addition to technical difficulties, several other common barriers to negotiations 
between the states are evident, including an excess of governmental agencies, cultural 
differences, language barriers, and “dramatically different forms of government and notions 
of politics.”148 The added factor of economic differences between the countries limits 
technology and infrastructure, creating another potential difficulty to ensuring the needs of 
both states are met. Despite these obstacles, the neighboring towns of El Paso, Texas and 
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico provide an excellent example of what governments should do to 
ensure the right to water for their citizens. Evaluating the issues faced by these two nations 
and their potential responsibilities towards one another provides important information for 
similar trans-border locations.149 
While no law exists governing the groundwater shared by these two cities, efforts are 
being made to work together for sustainability.150  In December 1999, the water utilities of 
the two cities signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) designed to plan for water 
needs and avoid future water shortages.151  The agreement seeks to create a long-term use 
plan that considers future needs and population growth.152  The MOU obligates both parties 
to share groundwater data, including pumping quantities, with one another.153  Utility repair 
and upgrade are also included factors.154  Joint projects have been useful in understanding 
each city’s dependence on water sources and the development of usage plans.155 
Several measures have been put into place on both sides of the border to delay a water 
crisis.156  El Paso is attempting to create sustainability through reduced usage and rerouting 
irrigation water for municipal-use purposes.157  The city has also increased their 
144. G. Emlen Hall, Historical and Physical International Boundaries in Borderlands Water Conflicts: A 
Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 866 (2000). 
145. Irasema Coronado, Water Conflict in the Borderlands, 7 BORDERLINES 1, 2 (July 1999), at 
http://americas.irc-online.org/borderlines/1999/bl57/bl57oview_body.html. 
146. Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional 
Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973, 973–74 (2000). 
147. Jeffrey M. Klopatek et al., Ecosystem Differences and Climate Feedbacks Along the United States-
Mexico Border, 1998, at 6, available at http://www.scerp.org/projs/98rpts/NR-98-2a.pdf. The United States 
Department of Agriculture estimates that the drought in the Rio Grande basin started in 1993 and it is currently 
categorized as extreme. Marilyn C. O’Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for Solving Border Groundwater 
Issues, 11 U.S.-MEX. L. J. 57, 59 (2003).  “‘[D]rought’ means a moisture deficit bad enough to have social, 
environmental or economic effects.”  David Miskus, U.S. Drought Monitor, http://drought.unl.edu/dm/classify.htm 
(last updated July 28, 2005). 
148. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 146, at 978. 
149. See Octavio E. Chavez, Mining of Internationally Shared Aquifers: The El Paso-Juárez Case, 40 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 237 (2000). 
150. See id. at 248–50. 
151. Memorandum of Understanding (City of Juárez Utilities & El Paso Water Utilities) (Dec. 1999) (on file 
with author). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Chavez, supra note 149, at 248–50. 
156. See O’Leary, supra note 147, at 57; Chavez, supra note 149, at 241. 
157. Chavez, supra note 149, at 245; Rene Romo, Border’s Future Caught Between Growth, Water Supply, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 19, 1999, para. 11, available at http://www.adqjournal.com/2000/nm/ why/6why09-19-
99.htm. 
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dependence on surface water.158 On the other side of the border, Ciudad Juárez plans to use 
some of its annual Rio Bravo allocation for municipal purposes to alleviate the burden on 
the Rio Grande.159  Juarez is also attempting to reduce water by repairing utility system 
infrastructure, because many of the systems are broken down.160 
Juarez and El Paso prove that equitable utilization does not have to mean equal. 
Although the majority of the Hueco Bolson aquifer lies beneath Texas, Mexico’s 
withdrawals from the aquifer exceed those of Texas.161  Although usage is not equal, it is 
still equitable for these users due to regional issues including population demand and 
availability of alternative water sources.162  Federal governments should either create 
agreements similar to what is seen along the Mexico border or support regional agreements 
that serve a similar function. 
A case study of this region also enables the discussion of economic inequities because 
of the significant fiscal disparities between the United States and Mexico.163  Economic 
differences give rise to important considerations in shared water resources allocation.  One 
way financial impacts are reflected in this area is the amount of water the United States and 
Mexico pump from the Hueco Bolson aquifer.164  El Paso is able to be less dependent on 
the Hueco Bolson, in part, because the city has the capital to utilize alternative water 
sources and technology.165 El Paso has developed a technologically advanced water 
treatment plant that supplements the city’s water needs through enhanced recharge and 
gray-water practices.166  However, treatment technology is extremely expensive, which 
impedes Mexico’s ability to build similar facilities.167 
Due to the proximity of the two states, environmental hazards created in Mexico by a 
lack of infrastructure directly affect both sides of the border; therefore, the United States 
has a vested interest in assisting Mexico with water supply and treatment facilities.168  For 
158. Chavez, supra note 149, at 239, 245. 
159. O’Leary, supra note 147, at 58. 
160. Chavez, supra note 149, at 246. 
161. In 2004, El Paso pumped 49,480 acre-feet from the aquifer while Ciudad Juárez pumped 119,420 acre-
feet (author telephone interview with Michael Fahy, El Paso Water Utilities, El Paso, Tex., conducted on Apr. 12, 
2005). 
162. The current population of El Paso (city and county combined) is approximately 700,000 people, whereas 
estimates of the population of Ciudad Juárez range from 1.2 million to 1.4 million people.  U.S. Census Bureau, 
State and County Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48141.html (last revised Jan. 12, 2006); 
compare El Paso/Juárez Fact Sheet: Estimated Population January 1, 2005 (estimating the population of Ciudad 
Juárez at 1.2 million based on the 2000 census), http://www.ci.el-paso.tx.us/demographics.asp (follow “Quick 
Facts-El Paso, TX & Cd. Juarez, Mexico” hyperlink), with Answers.com, Cuidad Juárez (estimating population at 
1.4 million people), http://www.answers.com/topic/ciudad-juarez.  In addition to the difference in numbers, growth 
in is increasing at a much faster rate in Ciudad Juárez than El Paso.  Chavez, supra note 149, at 237–38 (explaining 
population increased 63 percent in Ciudad Juárez and 34 percent in El Paso between 1980 and 1994). 
163. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Mexico (stating that the average per capita 
income in Mexico is one-fourth that of the United States), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
mx.html#Econ (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). 
164. Author Telephone Interview with Michael Fahy, El Paso Water Utilities, El Paso, Tex. (Apr. 12, 2005). 
165. See El Paso Water Utilities, Water Resources: Past and Present Supplies, 
http://www.epwu.org/water/water_resources.html (last visited May 23, 2006); El Paso Water Utilities, Wastewater: 
Northeast—Fred Hervey Plant, http://www.epwu.org/wastewater/fred_hervey_reclaimation.html (last visited May 
23, 2006). 
166. See El Paso Water Utilities, Wastewater: Northeast—Fred Hervey Plant, supra note 165. 
167. Ed Archuleta, There’s No Doubt, We’re in a Drought!  How a Large Municipality Plans to Meet Its 
Future Water Supply Needs, NEW MEXICO WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Oct. 2002, at 87 
(presentation given by Mr. Archuleta, the General Manager of the El Paso Water Utilities Public Service Board, 
discussing the cost of building a $60 million desalinization plant), at http://wrri.nmsu.edu/ 
publish/watcon/proc47/archuleta.pdf. 
168. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n [IBWC], Background of the International Border Sanitation Problem 
and Solutions (discussing intermittent cross-boundary sewage flows from Mexico into the United States as a result 
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this reason, the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) has constructed 
several water treatment plant proposals along the border to reduce the environmental 
degradation occurring along the border.169 A MOU between the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and Mexico’s Secretariat of Environment, Natural 
Resources and Fisheries concerning the funding of infrastructure for water and wastewater 
states Mexico’s financial responsibilities are contingent on availability and can vary based 
on the terms of each specific agreement.170  At the California treatment plant, each party 
shares economic responsibility for construction and maintenance of the facility, but the 
United States will tender immediate payment, whereas Mexico is permitted to pay their 
share in installments over ten years.171 These types of agreements show why neighboring 
states should consider economics and shared water issues to preserve the sustainability of 
both countries and maintain peace between them.172  This type of cooperation is difficult 
due to sovereignty conflicts and notions of ownership over natural resources.  These 
obstacles only increase when two states are experiencing political conflict. 
B. Governments During Conflict 
When conflict arises, questions emerge regarding the validity of existing treaties and 
international agreements.173  During these times, a few sources of customary international 
law define the parameters that confine a state’s behavior towards individuals.  These 
sources of humanitarian law seek to provide some security to nonmilitary citizens, 
especially women and children, in a time defined by incivility.174  These protections include 
guarding against the purposeful deprivation of water.175  Among these resources, the 
of the Mexican inability to keep up with rapidly growing waste processing), http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/ 
background.html (last visited May 23, 2006). 
169. See, e.g., IBWC, Minute 283: Conceptual Plan for the International Solution to the Border Sanitation 
Problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California (July 2, 1990) (providing for the creation of a water 
treatment plant on the California/Mexico border), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/ 
Minute283.pdf. A “minute” is an agreement reached by the Commission and submitted to both governments for 
approval.  Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional Responsiveness and 
Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 397, 398 (1993).  The IBWC is the 
intergovernmental agency relied upon by both Mexico and the United States to monitor international boundary 
waters and settle disputes of its use along the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border.  Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. 
Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource Management: The United States Section of the 
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 661–62 
(1990); Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Supply Issues From the Perspective of the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 35, 
35 (2003). 
170. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Program of Joint Grant Contributions for Drinking 
Water Supply and Wastewater Infrastructure Projects for Communities in the United States-Mexico Border Area, 
at b (Sept. 25, 2000), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/MOU304.pdf. 
171. IBWC, Minute 283, supra note 169.  Similar Minutes have been signed for several other locations along 
the border. See, e.g., Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, Minute 297: Operations and Maintenance Program and 
Distribution of its Costs for the International Project to Improve the Quality of the Waters of the Rio Grande at 
Laredo, Texas-Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas (May 31, 1997), available at 
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min297.pdf. 
172. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 24. 
173. See, e.g., Techt v. Hughs, 128 N.E. 185 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1920) (examining whether a treaty is still valid if 
there is a war between contracting parties). 
174. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Civilians in War (Oct. 1, 1995), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMKZ.  Humanitarian law is the class of international law aimed 
at protecting citizens during times of war and conflict. See id. 
175. Id. 
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Geneva Conventions176 and The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of 
War on Land (Hague Resolutions) are cited most often.177  Any relevant customary 
international law would also apply.178 
The Geneva Convention contains “the most important rules limiting the barbarity of 
war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting . . . and those who can no 
longer fight . . . .”179  Originally adopted in 1864, the Geneva Convention was updated in 
several areas in 1949 and two additional protocols were added in 1977.180  The purpose of 
the convention is to prevent “grave breaches” during and after war and provide an 
enforcement mechanism for violations.181  The Hague Resolutions provide the second 
major source of law during conflict.  Although the purpose of the first Hague conference 
was to discuss ways to halt the arms race, many other issues were encompassed resulting in 
the Hague Resolutions.182 
Humanitarian law is particularly applicable to water resources because 
“[c]ontaminated water and lack of water can be more deadly than a whole array of 
weapons.”183 In addition to the necessity of water for physical survival, the lack of 
sufficient water can also have a critical impact on civilians by threatening crops and 
livestock and inhibiting protection against disease.184 The power water holds over a society 
176. For the purpose of this discussion, references to the Geneva Convention include the original 1864 
convention (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field), the 
four 1949 Conventions, and the 1979 Additional Protocols. 
177. See ICRC, Water and War: Extract from Protection of the Civilian Population in Periods of Armed 
Conflict; 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Sept. 15, 1995), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMLK; see also Harold Dichter, The Legal Status of Israel’s 
Water Policies in the Occupied Territories, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 565, 573 (1994). 
178. See ICRC, Customary Law Study Enhanced Legal Protection of Persons Affected by Armed Conflict 
(March 17, 2005) (reporting the identification of 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law that 
extends treaty law and increases the protection of individuals in an armed conflict). 
179. ICRC, The Geneva Conventions: The Core of International Humanitarian Law (Mar. 2004), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions. 
180. Id. (listing the subjects of the Conventions and Protocols).  The original idea for the Geneva Convention 
was proposed in a book by Henry Dunant, who envisioned a legal basis to require countries to reduce the suffering 
of wounded soldiers.  ICRC, The ICRC and the Geneva Convention (1863–1864) (Dec. 29, 2004), at 
http://www.icrc.org. The book, entitled UN SOUVENIR DE SOLFÉRINO (A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO), led to the 
creation of the Geneva Public Welfare Society (which later became the Red Cross) and the approval of the Geneva 
Convention under its original name, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
in Armies in the Field.  Id.; HENRY DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO (The American Nat’l Red Cross 1959). 
The four additional conventions added to the Geneva Convention in 1949 are entitled 1) Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 2) Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; 3) 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and 4) Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War.  The 1977 Protocols were drafted to supplement the 1949 Conventions.  Jean 
de Preux, The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS NO. 320 (Oct. 31, 
1997), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/ iwpLIst163/3CDB6A2F3EAA0EFFC1256B66005. 
B01B2. The need to supplement the existing texts was created by the emergence of long term hostilities and 
changes in how armed conflicts were occurring. Id. 
181. ICRC, supra note 179. Grave breaches are defined differently in each of the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols; however, for the purpose of this paper, a general definition is “the willful killing, 
torture or inhuman treatment, including . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health . . . .” Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
182. Hague Appeal for Peace, History/Archives, http://www.haguepeace.org/index.php?action=history&s 
ubAction=con (last visited May 23, 2006).  The Hague Resolutions were originally drafted in 1899 when delegates 
from twenty-six countries gathered at The Hague in response to an invitation from the then Russian Czar, Nicholas 
II. Id. 
183. ICRC, supra note 174.  Comment 1 notes that the right to water in times of conflict includes all 
requirements by which states are bound under international humanitarian law. See ICESCR Comment 15, supra 
note 10, para. 22. 
184. Id. (explaining that the destruction of water resources can force displacement of citizens). 
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makes it a logical target in war; however, as international conflict law evolves, limitations 
are increasingly placed on the use of water as a military strategy.185 
Although rare, some additional international documents directly address water.  The 
1997 U.N. Watercourse Convention includes a provision stating, “[i]nternational 
watercourses and related installations, facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection 
accorded by the principles and rules of international law applicable in international and 
non-international armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those principles and 
rules.”186  This principle appears to refer directly to the restrictions placed by Protocol I of 
1977 to the Geneva Convention (Protocol I).187  Unlike previous articles that have been 
applied to water, Article 54 of Protocol I specifically prohibits a state to “attack, destroy, 
remove or render useless . . . drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works.”188  This obligation can only be overcome if the offending country can show that the 
act was a military imperative, but even this exception has a limitation.189  The location must 
be situated within territory under the attacking state’s own control.190  If the water resource 
is located in an area still within the control of the predecessor state, it should be fully 
protected under international law.191 
The protection of water is also included in certain humanitarian environmental 
provisions, which are generally accepted by the international community.192  Environmental 
concerns during war are almost as old as war itself.193  However, the increase in 
environmental awareness and advances in military technology have forced the 
reconsideration of the environmental consequences of warmongering.194  At the heart of 
this new movement are Protocol I and 1977 Convention of the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).195 
Several articles of Protocol I create protections for the environment.  Article 35 states 
“it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.”196  This 
obligation is further defined by Article 55, which specifically requires the protection of the 
natural environment against damage that would endanger the health or survival of 
individuals.197 ENMOD is another treaty created to protect the environment during war. 
Similar to Protocol I, the treaty prohibits hostile use of environmental modification 
185. See ICRC, supra note 177. 
186. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 29. 
187. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 54 
[hereinafter Victims of International Armed Conflicts].  A similar provision is seen in Article 14 of Protocol II. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 14, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442. 
188. Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 54, para. 2. 
189. Id. art. 54, para. 3. 
190. Id. art. 54, para. 5. 
191. Id. 
192. Ameur Zemmali, The Protection of Water in Times of Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 
NO. 308 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwp List74/0324E0993060C6 
5EC1256B66005981DE. 
193. See Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime: An Overview, in  ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 16, 16 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000) (citing a Biblical reference to the 
prohibition of fruit tree destruction during a siege). 
194. Id. 
195. Mark Perry & Ed Miles, Environmental Warfare, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD 
KNOW 132, 132–33 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999). 
196. Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 35. 
197. Id. art. 55. 
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techniques that will cause long term damage to the environment.198  Because water is an 
integral part of the natural environment, the corruption of natural water supplies would fall 
under the protection of these provisions. 
In addition to the inclusion of water in environmental provisions, there are four other 
categories of wartime prohibitions that can be applied to water: (1) poison as a means of 
warfare; (2) destruction of enemy property; (3) attack on objects necessary for civilian 
survival; and (4) attacks on installations that contain dangerous forces.199  Article 23 of the 
Hague Resolution prohibits the use of poison.200  Its general scope allows its application to 
the purposeful contamination of water sources.201  Also contained in Article 23, as well as 
Article 53 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), is the prohibition on the destruction of enemy 
property “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations.”202 This property can include water and wastewater facilities as well as natural 
water sources that are considered property. 
The third prohibition is particularly helpful in deterring the destruction of water 
resources because it protects against the targeting of “objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population.”203 Nothing could fit this description better than water.  Whether 
a document specifically lists water like Protocol I or just generally prohibits the destruction 
of a necessary object, water should be included. 
Finally, attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces are 
prohibited.204 The primary way this would affect water would be the destruction of dams or 
dykes.205  An exception is allowed if the facility is used “in regular, significant and direct 
support of military operations” and destruction is the only option.206  However, even in this 
situation, the attacking state is required to consider the potential of severe losses of civilian 
life.207  “[S]o long as water is a civilian object and indispensable to the survival of the 
population, warfare against or by means of water is utterly incompatible with the principles 
and rules of humanitarian law . . . .”208 
198. Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, [hereinafter ENMOD].  ENMOD was written in 
response to the widespread use of chemicals, such as Agent Orange, during the Vietnam War. See Michael N. 
Schmitt, War and the Environment: Fault Lines in the Prescriptive Landscape, in  ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 87, 88 & n.6 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000). 
199. Zemmali, supra note 192. 
200. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23 (a), annexed to Convention [No. 
IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 37 Stat. 2277. 
201. See id. 
202. Id. art. 23(g).  Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 76 U.S.T. 3516 (categorizing “extensive destruction . . . not justified by 
military necessity” as a “grave breach”) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
203. Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 54. 
204. Id. art. 56. 
205. Id. art. 56, para. 1. A dam or a dyke can be used in conjunction with a power utility or as a reservoir and 
their destruction of either type of facility would have severe effects on regional water sources. 
206. Id. art. 56, para. 2. 
207. Id art. 56, para. 3 (limiting all military operations by the requirements of Article 57, which cautions 
against all attacks that may cause potential losses of civilian life). 
208. Zemmali, supra note 192.  Avoiding the targeting of water resources and installations used by civilians 
comports with the general international law principle that armed forces are not to attack civilian populations or 
targets. See David P. Fidler, War and Infectious Diseases: International Law and Public Health Consequences of 
Armed Conflict, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, 444, 457 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds., 
2000). 
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C. Governments After Conflict 
After a conflict has drawn to a close leaving one state as the occupying government of 
another state, additional rules regulate the conduct of the occupier.209  Many of the 
humanitarian principles previously discussed from the Hague Resolutions and the Geneva 
Convention apply both to combat situations and belligerent occupiers.210  Although these 
documents are the primary source, other helpful sources of humanitarian law also limit 
occupier behavior.211  These laws were created to protect citizens based on the assumption 
that the occupation will be temporary, therefore during the interim the belligerent occupier 
is supposed to maintain the status of the occupied territory and not exercise sovereignty 
over it.212 
The Hague Regulations, created in 1907, were the first source of codified 
international law to extensively deal with the situation of occupied territories.  The 
Regulations were annexed to the 1899 Hague Resolutions.213  Made up of fifty-six articles, 
fourteen of the Hague Regulations limit behavior pursued by a belligerent occupier.214  The 
resolutions differentiate between private and public property and severely limit the right of 
the occupier to use, confiscate, or destroy anything that qualifies as private property.215  As 
in combat situations, the resolutions prohibit the use of poison or poisonous weapons, 
pillaging, and the destruction of enemy property unless it is a military imperative.216 
Of the two primary sources, the Geneva Convention, specifically the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, provides more stringent guidelines and requirements for belligerent 
occupiers.217  Several articles in this convention can be applied to water; however, the 
convention has been criticized for its vagueness and propensity for open-ended 
interpretation.218  Perhaps the most direct rule, provided by Article 89, states that “sufficient 
drinking water shall be supplied to internees . . . .”219  Internees, who are being transferred, 
209. An occupied territory is defined as “the sovereign territory of a State that is under the military 
occupation of another State at a time when a state of war exists between them.”  Robbie Sabel, The Problematic 
Fourth Geneva Convention: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation, JURIST (Nov. 13, 2003), available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew120.php.  The occupation must meet the requirements of a “belligerent 
occupation” such that the sovereign state is prevented from exercising its authorities in the territory.  Id. 
210. Dichter, supra note 177, at 573. See B’Tselem, The Water Crisis in the Occupied Territories (listing 
specific articles of international law that bind Israel to provide sufficient water to the occupied territories), 
http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org.node.php?id=613 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
211. See ICRC, Customary Law Study Enhanced Legal Protection of Persons Affected by Armed Conflict 
(March 17, 2005) (including international humanitarian law as a “major source of rules applicable in times of 
armed conflict”), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/ 
5EE8038BB6EAA2CDC1256FC70037BEF4. 
212. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 65, 91 (2003). 
213. George Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 42 (2000). 
214. ICRC, Water and War: Extract from Protection of the Civilian Population in Periods of Armed Conflict; 
26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, supra note 177; Imseis, supra note 212, at 89. 
215. Dichter, supra note 177, at 575 (discussing articles 52 and 53 of The Hague Resolutions). 
216. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 200, arts. 23(a) & (g), 28, 
47. 
217. Dichter, supra note 177, at 578.  The Fourth Geneva Convention was created as part of the expansion of 
the Geneva Convention that took place in 1949.  Imseis, supra note 212, at 60–65.  The primary purpose of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention was to define the allowable behavior of a belligerent occupier and supplement the 
existing Hague Regulations. See id. at 89. The Convention accomplishes this task by providing a bill of rights for 
the occupied territory and shifting attention from the ousted sovereign to the civilians who remain under 
occupation. Id. at 91. 
218. See Dichter, supra note 177, at 578–85 (explaining the articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention that 
could be applied to water in the occupied territories and demonstrating their faults and ambiguities). 
219. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 181, art. 89. 
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and prisoners of war must be provided with sufficient drinking water, with quantity and 
quality provisions.220  The previously discussed prohibition on the destruction of objects 
necessary for the survival of the civilian population, even as reprisal, assists in the 
protection of water resources during occupation.221 
As an extension of the obligations created for governments in conflict, Protocol I’s 
Article 56 provides specific instruction for belligerent occupiers.222  The article requires the 
occupying state to ensure civilian populations receive protections afforded to them by 
international law.223  Although protection of civilian property is not specifically mentioned, 
it can be inferred to be present from the second sentence of the paragraph, which 
differentiates between works, installations, and military objectives, and protects all three.224 
Protocol I’s Article 54, which prohibits attacks on drinking water works or installations, 
also applies to a belligerent occupier.225 
In addition to protecting existing working water utilities, Protocol I also requires that 
civil defense organizations perform emergency repairs of indispensable public utilities.226 
This provision takes into consideration accidental destruction of water supply systems that 
can occur by ensuring that they are returned to working order instead of being dismissed as 
collateral damage.227  This provision is particularly important in an occupation setting 
because it establishes an ongoing responsibility as opposed to one that is associated only 
with an invasion or the initial conflict.228 
General Comment 15 also provides guidance in these circumstances. The 
international obligations described previously apply to a occupying government in the same 
way they would to a neighboring government.229  These articles call for full participation in 
the realization of the right to water as it is described in the comment, requiring the 
belligerent occupier to respect, protect, and fulfill the water needs of the citizens.230 
In addition, Article 29 of the Watercourse Convention affords protection for 
“international watercourses and related installations” during conflict and applies during 
occupation because the article does not limit the definition of “armed conflict.”231  These 
international humanitarian principles create a construct for the protection of an individual in 
a time when his right might otherwise be lost, but whether these requirements are followed 
is often subject to interpretation.232 
1. Israel-Palestine 
The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
began as a result of the Six Day War of 1967.233 At that time, Israel became responsible for 
220. Id. art. 127; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, arts. 20, 26, 46. 
221. Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 56, paras. 2 & 4. 
222. Id. art. 56, para. 3. 
223. Id. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. art. 54, para. 3; see discussion supra Part V.B.2. 
226. Id. art. 61 (a)(xii). 
227. See Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 61. 
228. See id. 
229. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, paras. 30–36. 
230. Id. paras. 21–29. 
231. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 29. 
232. See, e.g., Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 
212, at 69–83 (presenting arguments relating to Israeli compliance with humanitarian law when dealing with the 
Palestinian states). 
233. Id. at 69. 
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governing these occupied territories, and water resources became public property under 
existing Israeli law.234  Israel has water obligations to Palestine235 as an occupied territory 
under international humanitarian law and under international water law because most of the 
water sources are shared.236 
Due to climatic realities and growing population, water is one of the most difficult 
and severe issues surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.237  While these issues are 
currently pressing, water conflicts in this region are not new and have been recorded 
throughout time.238  In recent history, control of water resources became an issue as soon as 
the occupation began and remains so today.239 Despite the fact that all major accords 
signed by Israel and Palestine include groundwater provisions, a final solution has not been 
achieved.240 “To achieve peace, Palestinians and Israelis must share both the land and the 
water.”241 
Israel and the occupied territories obtain their water from ground and surface water 
sources.242  Despite the presence of water sources, issues remain because annual recharge 
234. Stefan Deconinck, Jordan River Basin: Israeli Water Policy in a Regional Context of Conflict: 
Prospects for Sustainable Development for Israelis and Palestinians, Part I.2. (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://waternet.be/jordan_river/waterpolicy.htm.  Upon the implementation of Israeli law, water rights shifted from 
the landowners to the Israeli Civil Administration, which placed meters on Palestinian wells and required permits 
to drill any additional wells. Id. 
235. Although Palestine does not exist as a recognized state, for simplicity, this term will be used throughout 
this section to refer to the territories populated by Palestinians. 
236. B’Tselem, supra note 210. One of the weaknesses in applying international law to belligerent 
occupation is that it does not directly concern the allocation of shared resources; therefore, both bodies of law must 
be evaluated.  Dichter, supra note 177, at 586. 
237. Deconinck,  supra  note  234,  at  Introduction  (listing  water  as  one of the five major impediments to 
peace,  stating:  “Without  a  sustainable  solution  for  the  water  conflict, Israel and the Palestinians  
are heading  for  a  disastrous  water  crisis  in  the  first  quarter  of  this  century”);   Dichter,  supra  note  177, 
at 567 (asserting that Israeli population grew four times within the first forty years after 1949 and its water use 
increased more than eight times). Average annual rainfall ranges from 1000 mm in the north to less than 100 mm 
in the south. Nation by Nation, Geography: Israel, http//:www.nationbynation.com/Israel/Geo.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2006).  Seventy percent of yearly rainfall occurs between November and March and the summer months 
often have no precipitation. Id. This is a problem because people who rely on rainwater collected in cisterns for 
their drinking water must find other sources during the dry months.  Yehezkel Lein, Thirsty for a Solution: The 
Water Crisis in the Occupied Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement, at 42 (2000), available 
at http://www.beselem.org/Download/200007_Thirsty_for_a_Solution_Eng.doc.  To compound matters, rain often 
falls in large quantities during violent rain storms, increasing the loss of possible recharge to overland flooding. 
Nation by Nation, Geography: Israel. See Christina Reed, Sharing Water in the West Bank, GEOTIMES (2000) 
(reporting a rain event on October 25, 2000, when three inches of rain fell in only six hours, causing a major flood 
event), available at http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes/dec00/westbank.html. 
238. See generally Peter Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology, Dec. 6, 2004 (listing water conflicts in the 
Middle East dating from 3000 BC including Old Testament accounts of water being used as a military and 
religious tool), http://www.worldwater.org/conflictchronology.html. 
239. Jad Isaac, Water and Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations, POL’Y BRIEF NO. 4 (1999) (stating one of 
the first orders imposed by the Israeli military was Order No. 92, issued August 15, 1967, which categorized water 
as a strategic resource). 
240. See SHARIF S. ELMUSA, NEGOTIATING WATER: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS (1996), available at 
http://www.ipsjps.org/html/water3.htm.  Three major agreements between Israel and Palestine are: (1) the 
Declaration of Principles, signed on December 1993; (2) The Cairo Agreement, signed on May 4, 1994; and (3) the 
Taba Agreement, signed on September 28, 1995. Id.  Although not a bilateral agreement, Israel also passed a 
comprehensive long-term water plan in August 2001 which estimated future water use and presented an integrated 
approach that included consolidating long-term consumption, protection of natural resources, and ideas for new 
water sources. See Deconinck, supra note 234, Part I.2. 
241. Reed, supra note 237. 
242. See B’Tselem, supra note 210 (providing information about two main water sources: the Mountain 
Aquifer and the Upper Jordan River).  Israel depends on the Mountain Aquifer for more than one quarter of its 
water supplies, and the Jordan Basin for one third.  Jessica McCallin, Making the Blooms Desert (May 11, 2002), 
available at http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/ node.php?id=618. 
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only slightly exceeds annual combined use.243  The primary source of groundwater is the 
Mountain Aquifer.244  The aquifer slopes away from the highlands underneath confining 
layers in three directions: one eastward toward the Jordan Rift Valley, which lies entirely 
underneath the West Bank; one northeastward underneath Israel, and one westward 
underneath Israel proper.245 Its recharge waters flow underground across the armistice line, 
or Green Line into Israel.246  Almost eighty percent of the water mined from this water 
source is used by Israel, and the remainder supplies almost all of the running water used by 
Palestinians in the West Bank.247  This is an important statistic when comparing the 
population to use ratio because Palestine is limited to such a small portion of shared 
resource for their population. 
A second aquifer, called the Coastal Aquifer, runs along the Mediterranean Sea in 
Israel and the Gaza Strip and is shared by the two states.248  Made up of two parts, this 
aquifer differs from the Mountain Aquifer because the recharge area is also the storage and 
extraction area.249  The important aspect of the two-part system is that the Israeli portion is 
not an international aquifer.250  The third source of water is the surface water found in the 
Upper Jordan Basin and its tributaries.251 Palestine does not receive any water from this 
source.252  Minor amounts of water are also acquired from natural springs and rainfall 
catchments.253 
Both Israelis and Palestinians have valid concerns and arguments regarding the 
current water situation.  Palestinian supporters argue that “maldistribution of water in Israel 
and the Palestinian territories reflects an unequal balance of power rather than 
internationally formulated agreements or international law.”254  Palestinians are especially 
troubled by Israel’s unilateral control of water resources including distribution.255  They  
feel Israel’s goal to “bloom the desolate land and convert the spacious Negev into a source 
of force and power” is being achieved at their expense.256  Specifically, Israel is accused of 
using more than its fair share and retaining the majority of water resources for its citizens 
243. Water and the Environment, PALESTINE FACTS, at 276 (2004) (stating that the recharge rate of water 
supplies does not exceed 2634 million cubic meters (mcm) per year while use averages 2570 mcm, 
http://www.passia.org/index_pfacts.htm. 
244. See B’Tselem, supra note 211.  The Mountain Aquifer extends 130km, north to south stretching from 
Mount Carmel to Beersheva, and 35km east to west from the Dead Sea to the eastern border of the coastal strip. 
Id.  It obtains its recharge from rain that falls primarily in the West Bank Mountains. Id. The aquifer provides one 
third of Israel’s total water consumption.  Id. Yoram Eckstein & Gabriel Eckstein, Groundwater Resources and 
International Law in the Middle East Peace Process, 28 WATER INT’L 154, 154 (2003). 
245. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 244, at 155. 
246. Deconinck, supra note 234, Part I.I. 
247. Lein, supra note 237, at 3.  Per capita water use in Israel is approximately 411 cubic meters per person. 
Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 244, at 155. In the West Bank, Israeli settlers use an average of 1143 cubic meters 
per person compared to an average 139 cubic meters per person used by Palestinians in the same region. Id. 
248. Lein, supra note 237, at 22. 
249. Id. at 22. 
250. Id. at 23. 
251. See B’Tselem, supra note 210. Water is supplied to the Upper Jordan through its tributaries, the Sea of 
Galilee, the Yarmuh and the lower Jordan River.  Id. 
252. Lein, supra note 237, at 3. 
253. Lucy Mair et al., Thirsting for Justice: Israeli Violations of the Human Right to Water in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories: A Report to the 30th Session of the United Nations Committee of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, at 11 (2003). 
254. Isaac, supra note 239; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Question of the Violation of 
Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, para. 6, U.N. COMM’N ON HUMAN RTS., RES. 
2003/6 (condemning the “biased administration of water resources”), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/ 
documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2003-6.doc. 
255. Isaac, supra note 239. Critics of this allegation argue that Israel’s exercise of power over water 
resources is not prohibited by international law.  Dichter, supra note 177, at 567. 
256. Talal Jabari, Waterless World, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Aug. 22–28, 2002) (quoting the first Israeli Prime 
Minister, David Ben-Gurion), available at http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=612. 
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instead of providing water to the occupied territories.257 Israel has also been charged with 
targeting water resources for military strikes.258 Palestinians believe that under 
international law they not only have a right to a viable water supply, but also have 
sovereign rights to the Eastern Aquifer resources because it is located entirely under the 
West Bank, as well as equitable water rights in the Western and Northeastern Aquifer 
because the West Bank supplies their primary source of recharge.259 
Israel defends its water strategy by citing climate and security concerns.260  They  
argue that the primary problems are water scarcity and mismanagement of water by the 
Palestinian government.261  As the occupier, Israel is responsible for ensuring long-term 
sustainability; this includes resource management and consideration of economic 
concerns.262  In addition to climatic limitations, negotiations are influenced by Israel’s need 
to consider that any future compromises could increase water demand.263  In response to 
current concerns, Israel has considered alternative water sources to meet the needs of the 
combined community and has attempted to decrease consumption.264  Although criticized 
for their methods, Israel might argue that it has endeavored to balance the application of 
humanitarian provisions to the West Bank and Gaza with the protection of the sustainability 
of the entire community.265 Regardless of personal opinions concerning the validity of 
Palestine’s or Israel’s position, it can be acknowledged that an agreement has not been 
reached and the realization of peace depends on one.266 
An effort to solve some human rights issues in this region occurred at the 1995 Oslo 
Accords.267 Among other things, the Accords contained rules regarding free passage 
between territories and guidance for legal jurisdictions.  The Interim Agreement increased 
the Palestinian Authority control over water management, allowing additional development 
257. Isaac, supra note 239. Per capita, Palestinians use an average of only fifty liters of water a day, which is 
half of the World Health Organization’s estimated daily requirement.  Reed, supra note 237. 
258. See, e.g., Water Use and Distribution in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, PALESTINE MONITOR, FROM 
OCCUPIED PALESTINE (detailing Israeli attacks on Palestinian water tankers to prevent them from reaching water 
taps), http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=611 (last visited March 23, 2005); Amira Hass, 25,000 
Lack Water in Ramallah, HA’ARETZ, April 2, 2002, (“Some 25,000 people in Ramallah and its environs are 
without water after pipe lines . . . were ruptured by Israel Defense Forces tank movement in the city . . . .”), 
available at http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=617. 
259. Isaac, supra note 239. 
260. Id. “The implication is that, as a water scarce county, Israel’s viability depends on retaining all the 
water resources it now controls.” 
261. Dichter, supra note 177, at 567; Water a Vexed Issue for Israel, Palestine, JORDAN TIMES, July 7, 2000 
(quoting the Israeli Water Commission Manager, who stated: “We allocate according to the (1993) interim 
agreement . . . and even twenty percent more” and stating that water shortages are due to the Palestinian refusal to 
adopt environmental practices); see B’Tselem, supra note 210 (adding that an increase in the Palestinian’s standard 
of living has increased water demand). 
262. Deconinck, supra note 234, at 9 (mentioning that “huge financial inputs” are necessary to cope with the 
water issues that face this region). 
263. Reed, supra note 237 (“If Palestinian refugees are given the right to return to the occupied areas, 
demand for water will only increase.”). 
264. Isaac, supra note 239 (cataloguing possible solutions proposed by Israel, including massive 
desalinization projects, construction of additional pipelines, “Medusa Bags” ferrying water through the 
Mediterranean from water-rich countries, and tugging icebergs from northern seas); Deconinck, supra note 234, 
Introduction (discussing Israel’s August 2000 water strategy to decrease consumption, especially during times of 
drought). 
265. Sabel, supra note 209. 
266. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,, Water Resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, at 60 (1992), 
available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/296ee705038ac9fc 
852561170067e05f!OpenDocument. 
267. Na’ama Carmi, Oslo: Before and After: The Status of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, at 4 
(1999) (“The Oslo Accords require both Israel and the Palestine Authority to respect human rights.”), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199905_Oslo_Before_and_After_Eng.doc. 
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and pumping from shared resources.268 Since the signing, many human rights violations 
have been reduced; however, Israel still has broad powers over water, and no responsibility 
was given to Israel for infrastructure installation and repair in the occupied territories.269 
Because of these shortfalls, many argue more change is still necessary. Although a further 
compromise between the states would be the ideal method to impose an obligation on Israel 
to deliver additional water to the occupied territories, existing agreements, customary 
international law, and the human right to water, assuming it exists, create sufficient 
requirements. 
Under the Hague Resolutions, restrictions are contingent on the categorization of the 
property.270 It has been argued that Israel’s conversion of water resources to public 
property without compensation amounts to a taking of private property in violation of 
Article 46 of the Hague Resolutions.271  Proponents argue that the Article would also 
prohibit the metering of Palestinian wells and the granting of permits for Israelis to drill 
deeper wells while Arab extractions are further limited.272  This argument is problematic 
because in the West Bank much of the water used within the Israeli borders was mined by 
Israel before it occupied this area.273  In addition, a complete shift of the shared resource 
back to Palestine would not solve the water shortage problems, and the Palestinian 
government would be forced to implement regulations.274 
Another argument against Israel’s water policy is the prohibition to change 
legislation.  Article 43 of the Hague Resolutions does not allow the occupier to change a 
policy that existed before the occupation began unless it is a vital military necessity.275 
Israel has consistently defended its water policy as a defense and security measure for its 
state; therefore, it is arguable that this article would not apply.276  A later Article would 
seemingly prohibit the utilization of water of the occupied territory by the occupier; 
however, the Article does not describe how ownership is defined and if Israel does not have 
a right as an occupier, they could exert a valid claim to the water as a shared resource.277 
Article 43 provides: “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 
The Fourth Geneva Convention provides additional guidelines that Israel has arguably 
breached.278  Under the Convention, Israel is required to provide Palestine with suitable 
268. Id. at 22. 
269. Id. (explaining that any water-related project that will be within Palestinian control must be approved by 
Israel in the Israeli Water Committee).  Additional concerns are that since the agreements, Palestinian citizens are 
now suffering at the hands of the Israelis and their own government without protection.  Center for Economic and 
Social Rights, Occupied Palestinian Territories, at http://cesr.org/palestine (last visited May 23, 2006). 
270. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 200, art. 46. 
271. Dichter, supra note 177, at 579–80. 
272. Id. at 579–80. 
273. Id. at 580–81. 
274. Id. at 581. 
275. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 200, art. 43. The basis of 
this Article is the understanding that an occupation should be temporary and laws should be preserved for the 
return of an independent government.  Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, supra note 212, at 91. 
276. Isaac, supra note 239. 
277. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 200, art. 43. 
278. It should be noted that application of the Fourth Geneva Convention becomes problematic because 
Israel argues that Palestine does not qualify as an occupied territory and that, therefore, the Convention does not 
apply.  Dichter, supra note 177, at 578. Israel argues that because no legitimate sovereign was displaced in either 
the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, it cannot be categorized as a belligerent occupier.  Jad Isaac, Applied Research 
Institute-Jerusalem, Core Issues of the Palestinian-Israeli Water Dispute, available at 
http://www.arij.org/pub/corissues (last visited May 23, 2006).  See Imseis, supra note 212, at 92–100 (providing 
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quantity and quality of water.279  The discrepancy in per capita water usage and the water 
shortage Palestinians experienced indicates that this has not occurred.280  In addition, 
discrimination in water distribution between Israelis and Palestinians is prohibited. 
Discrimination of any kind between the occupying state and the occupied territory residents 
is prohibited.281  Further, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the willful causing of 
serious injury to body or health.282 Considering the connection between disease and 
availability of water resources, claims could be made against Israel under this article as 
well.283 
In addition to humanitarian law, international water law principles limit Israel’s 
sovereign right to water resources whether or not they are considered a belligerent 
occupier.284  Because these water resources are shared under the Watercourse Convention, 
Israel must use the water in an equitable and reasonable manner.285 To achieve this, they 
must consider the factors enumerated in the Watercourse Convention to ensure that the 
water is being used in a manner that is most equitable to all parties.286  Under Article 6, 
factors like past use and source of recharge would only be items for consideration and must 
be balanced with other information.287  The obligation not to cause harm also applies to the 
Israeli-Palestinian situation because of the shared watercourses.  Under this principle, one 
state’s use cannot cause harm to another watercourse state.288  It is arguable that Israel’s 
control over the Jordan River Basin and Mountain Aquifer violates this rule. 
Israel is in the difficult situation of meeting the needs of its citizens and complying 
with international humanitarian and water law in its water policies concerning the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.  While international law does not require Israel to sacrifice the 
needs of its state for another, Israel is required to implement an equitable and reasonable 
water plan.289  At a minimum, the basic water needs of the occupied territories must be 
met.290  To accomplish this, less of a disparity should exist between the per capita water 
usage between Israelis and Palestinians.291  When water is scarce, meeting basic human 
detailed legal arguments regarding whether Israel is a belligerent occupier and concluding that it should be bound 
by the Fourth Geneva Convention because it qualifies as a High Contracting Party). 
279. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 181, art. 55. 
280. Yahezkel Lein, Disputed Waters: Israel’s Responsibility for the Water Shortage in the Occupied 
Territories, Sept. 1998, at 26, available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/ 199809_Disputed_Waters_Eng.doc. 
281. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 181, art. 27. 
282. Id. art. 147. 
283. See THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 7 
284. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 5. 
285. There are several reasons why the Convention may not apply to this type of aquifer.  First, the aquifer 
has no relationship with a surface body of water, which appears to be a requirement under the Convention’s 
definition of “watercourse.”  Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 244, at 159.  Also, the Convention only applies to 
states; therefore, it cannot apply to the Palestinians until they are established as a state.  Id. at 160.  Lastly, neither 
Israel nor the Palestinians have signed the Watercourses Convention, which is still not in force. 
286. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 6.  The Helsinki Rules also have a similar list of factors 
that can provide guidance; however, the rules were created as recommendations and are not binding international 
law. The Helsinki Rules, supra note 102. 
287. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 6.  Israel has been a strong proponent that past use 
should be considered in future negotiations. SHARIF S. ELMUSA, NEGOTIATING WATER: ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
24 (1996).  Past use is included in the Helsinki Rules factors, but is not listed in the Watercourse Convention; 
however, the article does not contend to contain an exhaustive list of factors for consideration.  Watercourses 
Convention, supra note 103, art. 6. 
288. Id. art. 7. 
289. See id. art. 5. 
290. Lein, supra note 237, at 55. 
291. See id. at 35 (showing gaps of up to 400 percent in per capita water use between Israel and Palestine). 
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needs must be superior to luxuries like lawns and swimming pools.292  This requirement 
does not limit Israel from exploring alternative water sources or even maintaining control 
over water resources,293 but it does compel more water be made available to the 
Palestinians.294 This includes quantity and quality, as well as rehabilitation, construction, 
and maintenance of infrastructure to ensure a delivery mechanism.295  These goals would be 
obtained more efficiently through joint management.296  The theory of joint management is 
seen throughout international water law and relates strongly to cooperation.  Through these 
mechanisms hopefully further conflict and violence can be avoided. 
2. United States-Iraq 
Israel is not the only region where conflict impacts water. In a little more than one 
decade, Iraq has suffered severe sanctions and two military attacks by American forces. 
These events have had severe negative effects on local infrastructure including water and 
waste water utilities.297  Water was a significant issue in the 1991 Iraq invasion when 
millions of people were suddenly without water due to the bombing of power stations and 
damage to water treatment facilities.298  After the attack, the United States imposed strong 
economic sanctions against the country that lasted almost a decade which further degraded 
services.299 
On March 20, 2003, the United States and their coalition of forces again invaded Iraq 
in an attempt to discover weapons of mass destruction and remove Sadaam Hussein from 
power.300  On May 1, 2003, the United States declared the end of the combat phase and 
began efforts to put a temporary government in place and rebuild Iraq.301  Similar to the 
previous invasion, many water treatment facilities were damaged culminating into a water 
292. Id. at 42 (including both residential and industrial water in the category of basic human needs).  The 
Watercourses Convention also states that “special regard” must be given to “vital human needs” when resolving 
conflicts between shared water users. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 10. 
293. This statement is not intended to imply that Israel should remain in complete control of the regional 
water policy.  It is simply stating that, at minimum, under international water law Israel is required to supply 
Palestinians with enough water to meet basic survival needs in an equitable and reasonable manner. 
294. Mair, supra note 253, at 41–42. 
295. See, e.g., ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10.  Many houses in the Occupied Territories do not have 
running water due to the utility degradation that Israel has allowed during the occupation; however this number has 
decreased since the 1995 Oslo II agreement.  Yehezkel Lein, Not Even a Drop: The Water Crisis in Palestinian 
Villages Without a Water Network (2001), http://www.btselem.org/Download/ 
200107_Not_Even_A_Drop_Eng.doc (last visited May 23, 2006).  Oslo II requires the cessation of any attacks on 
water-related infrastructure.  See Mair, supra note 253, at 6. 
296. Oslo II, or the Taba Agreement, established a Joint Water Commission; however, the committee has not 
been successful in promoting Palestinians’ rights over their water resources because the committee has limited 
power and Israel has effective veto power over water initiatives.  Mair, supra note 253, at 15. 
297. Public Citizen, Iraq, http://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/cmep_Water/reports/iraq (last visited May 23, 
2006) (citing UNICEF reports that estimate in 2003, only nineteen percent of water treatment plants in southern 
and central Iraq were in good condition). 
298. ICRC, Civilians in War, supra note 174. 
299. Nausheen Hassan, U.S. Involvement in the Sanctions Against Iraq: A Potential Basis for a Legal Claim 
by Iraqi Women?, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 189, 205–07 (2001) (describing the effects of economic 
sanctions employed by the United States against Iraq created to debilitate the repressive Saddam Hussein 
government by restricting the importation of basic materials).  Comment 15 calls on parties to avoid imposing 
embargos that may prevent the supply of water to citizens.  ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 32. 
300. Special Report: Iraq Timeline: July 16 1979 to January 31 2004, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 31, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html. 
301. Id. “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies 
have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”  President George 
W. Bush, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003), transcript, available at 
http://www.usembassy.sk/cis/cisen051.html. 
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crisis for many Iraqi communities.302  Although a local government was eventually 
installed, the United States military and American corporations, acting as government 
contractors, along with voluntary aid organizations have been very involved in rebuilding 
the local infrastructure.303  One of these projects is fixing and expanding water systems.304 
Because many people view the United States as the current occupier of Iraq, questions have 
arisen regarding the U.S.’s responsibility towards the Iraqi citizens.305 
The first obstacle to the discussion of obligations is determining whether America 
qualifies as a belligerent occupier and, therefore, bound by humanitarian law. This 
decision is based on whether a hostile army has authority over a territory.306  Although this 
is a factual determination, the opinion of the potential occupier can provide useful 
information.307 The language that has been used by the United States in reference to Iraq 
resembles the definition seen in the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupied territory.308 
Also, the Security Council’s Resolution 1483 recognized this area as occupied and called 
for the occupants to pursue a new administration for Iraq.309  Based on the published 
opinions of the United States and the accepted definitions established by the Hague 
Resolutions and Fourth Geneva Convention, it is likely that international law would view 
Iraq as an occupied territory until its government becomes independent of the United 
States.310 
Assuming Iraq is an occupied territory, the United States must abide by humanitarian 
law, human rights law, international law generally, and any obligations it creates for itself. 
The Security Council announced the goal to promote the welfare of Iraq citizens.311  Water 
is a natural part of this.  Without adequate water supplies, industrial and agricultural 
recovery and development is not possible.312  This goal is also established by Article 43 of 
the Hague Resolutions, which requires the occupier to restore and ensure public order and 
life.313  This is to be accomplished by the existing laws in the country, which would include 
international obligations.314 
According the Geneva Convention, the utilization of the resources includes ensuring 
adequate supply for the occupied citizens.315  Similar to the Israel-Palestine discussion, this 
requirement includes the repair of infrastructure and the continued protection of existing 
302. Hassan, supra note 299, at 203–204. 
303. Public Citizen, supra note 297. 
304. Id. 
305. See Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 861 
(2003). These discussions will refer solely to the United States when discussing the occupying territory, but it 
should be noted that the occupying government also includes the United Kingdom. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 861–62. 
308. Id. at 861 (“The letter of May 8, 2003, from the permanent representatives of the United Kingdom and 
the United States addressed to the president of the Security Council communicates the two states’ pledge to 
‘strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential humanitarian 
needs of the people of Iraq.’”).  One example is the discussion regarding management of the Iraqi oil and the 
occupant’s utilization of public resources as allowable under the Hague Resolutions.  Id. at 864. 
309. Id. at 861–63. 
310. See Benvenisti, supra note 305, at 861–64; Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peace Building, at 4 (Harv. Univ. Program on Human. Pol’y & Conflict 
Res. Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 1, Fall 2004), available at http://www.hpcr.org/ 
pdfs/OccasionalPaper1.pdf. 
311. Benvenisti, supra note 305, at 864. 
312. Id. at 865. 
313. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 200, art. 43. 
314. Id. 
315. Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 187, art. 54(3)(b). 
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systems.316  In addition to meeting Iraq’s water needs, the United States must also assist 
Iraq to comply with international riparian obligations including the Watercourse 
Convention.317 
Beyond the duties of occupying governments, the situation in Iraq also engenders 
discussions about third-party requirements.  If a government has obligations as an 
occupying force, these obligations may persist even if work is delegated to a third party. 
Much of the repair work in Iraq is being completed by independent contractors who are 
earning large sums of money and may not be directly accountable to Iraqi citizens for their 
work.318  For example, Bechtel signed a contract in 2003 which required them to repair the 
water infrastructure in several urban areas within a set amount of time.319  The eighteenth-
month contract that Bechtel received was ultimately valued at $1.03 billion dollars.320 
Since the contract award, Bechtel has been accused of not accomplishing the assigned tasks 
while continuing to bill large amounts of money to the contract.321 
The World Health Organization argues that the human right to water creates 
obligations for corporations like Bechtel.322 One of these is to “act[] in an ethical manner 
towards the communities and residents that they are employed to deliver services to.”323 
Not completing the renovation of water facilities is a violation of this obligation.324  Despite 
this argument, Iraqis have no enforcement mechanism against Bechtel for violating human 
rights or humanitarian law, because it is a private corporation and not a government 
entity.325  However, corporations should not escape accountability when they are receiving 
compensation through government contracts to accomplish this important work.326 
According to Comment 15, the occupying government maintains a responsibility to 
ensure that third parties meet their obligations towards the human right to water.327  The  
easiest way to do this is for the government to incorporate those goals into the contract and 
enforce them.328  By requiring work be completed before payment is rendered, the United 
States government is actually ensuring water for many Iraqi citizens.329  The Comment also 
316. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10. 
317. Benvenisti, supra note 305, at 866–67.  This obligation is established by the Hague Resolution which 
states the occupant must “take all the measure in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety,” which includes compliance with laws. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, supra note 200, art. 43; Dinstein, supra note 310, at 28 (discussing the implications of Articles 43 and 
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
318. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Bechtel’s Dry Run: Iraqis Suffer Water Crisis (2004) (discussing failures by 
Bechtel to meet the contract obligations to repair water systems while collecting large sums of money from a 
government contract), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/publications/reports/bechtel-s-dry-run-iraqis-suffer-
water-crisis/pdf. 
319. See id. 
320. See id. 
321. Id. at 4–8. 
322. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 32. 
323. Id. 
324. See Public Citizen, supra note 318, at 4–8. 
325. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 31–32 (comparing attempting to hold corporations liable for water 
violations to the ultimately unenforceable U.N. effort to establish environmental provisions for corporations that 
was ultimately not enforceable).  Although an enforcement mechanism does not currently exist, “[i]f the 
international community decides to formulate a human right to water in a legally binding instrument, it also could 
expressly provide a corresponding duty on State and private actors alike, to protect that right.” Id. at 32. 
326. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, paras. 23–24. 
327. Id. para. 23. (“The obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent third parties from interfering in 
any way with the enjoyment of the right to water. Third parties include . . . corporations . . . acting under their 
authority.”). 
328. See id. para. 24. (“Where water services . . . are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties 
must prevent them from compromising . . . physical access to sufficient safe and acceptable water.  To prevent such 
abuses an effective regulatory system must be established . . . which includes . . . imposition of penalties for non-
compliance.”); Public Citizen, supra note 318, at 13. 
329. Id. at 13–14. 
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recommends the “imposition of penalties for non-compliance.”330  The American 
government also has an obligation under its own edict to set up a sustainable system in Iraq, 
which cannot be achieved through non-local corporations that are not completing their 
tasks.331  The government is the appropriate entity to make corporations accountable to the 
local communities.  Through state’s direct and indirect efforts, countries like Iraq can have 
a better future than their past, complete with ensured water resources.332 
IV. ENFORCEMENT 
In spite of international treaties . . . the world is witnessing a daily catalogue of 
horrors and atrocities perpetrated against the very people these laws were 
designed to protect. These violations do not illustrate the inadequacy of the law, 
but rather that the rules are either not known to leaders and combatant or that 
they are quite simply disregarded.333 
Enforcement only becomes an issue when there is a failure.334  When an established 
standard has been ignored or violated, the concepts of coercion, retribution, and 
remediation are raised.335 Although discussed in a limited context, the inability to repair an 
injury would vitiate the purpose of instilling rights.336  Human rights are often criticized as 
being unenforceable; however, several national and international mechanisms exist to 
ensure that governments fulfill the rights of their citizens. 
Perhaps the easiest implementation avenue for human rights is at the national level.337 
This option is limited by the assumption that rights have been incorporated into regional 
legal constructs, but many rights already exist in local documents.338  Standing to bring a 
claim for local enforcement can occur one of two ways.  The first, more obvious, approach 
is if the state explicitly includes the right to water in their governing documents.  If the right 
to water is implemented locally as proposed by Comment 15, states will create “legislation, 
strategies and policies” to ensure that the obligation is fulfilled.339  Ideally these directives 
would include judicial or administrative remedies that create accountability for local 
governments or municipalities.340  Similar protocols should be included in any agreement 
330. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 24. 
331. See Eyal Benvenisti, supra note 305, at 866–67. 
332. See ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, paras. 23–24. 
333. ICRC, Civilians in War, supra note 174. 
334. Imseis, supra note 212, at 122. 
335. Id. at 122; DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 38 (1999). 
336. See generally Imseis, supra note 212, at 122. 
337. SHELTON, supra note 336, at 57 (“Remedies for international human rights violations serve purposes 
similar to those of remedies in national law.”).  See, e.g., Michael Kidd, Not a Drop to Drink: Disconnection of 
Water Services for Non-Payment and the Right to Access of Water, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 119 (2004) (describing 
the national groundwater supply requirements in South Africa). 
338. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 542–45; see SHELTON, supra note 335, at 61–64 (explaining sources of 
remedies for human rights obligations found in national law). 
339. ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 46. 
340. See id. para. 55.  This can take the form of a notice requirement when a customer’s account is 
delinquent, warning that the water supply will be disconnected.  See Lindie Niklass, Negotiating the Rights of 
Access to Sufficient Water Through the Courts, at 261, 268, Presented at the 2nd Water Research Fund for South 
Africa/WaterNet Symposium on Integrated Water Resources Management (held at Cape Town, South Africa on 
Oct. 30–31, 2001), available at http://www.iwsd.co.zw/symposium2001/papers2/niklaas.pdf.  An individual may 
also have the right to a hearing to plead his financial situation and make payment arrangements accordingly.  See 
id. at 268–70. The availability of and procedure for a hearing could be explained in the notice.  An extreme 
measure would to be to require the utility company to gain a court order before disabling service.  See id. at 269– 
564 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 41:533 
with a third-party service provider.  Regional enforcement would mirror what is seen in the 
South African and Indian systems.341 In both of these countries, the right to water is 
included in either the constitution or the bill of rights and enforcement has been sought by 
citizens through the local court system.342 This system of accountability gives more power 
to the individual to ensure the fulfillment of his right to water.  The second way standing is 
established is through any treaties to which the state is a signatory.343  Violations of these 
agreements can be remedied the same way as just described.  Violations of either local law 
or treaties are under the jurisdiction of the local court system. 
If the right to water becomes an international human right, redress for a violation 
would be the same as for any human right.344  On an international level, several tribunals 
may be available.  Tribunals such as the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the 
European Court of Justice can all hear cases regarding treaty obligations or customary 
international law as long as jurisdiction exists.345  The creation of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals is another judicial alternative.346  Finally, forms of horizontal 
enforcement from other states in the form of economic pressure such as sanctions can also 
create a shift in conduct.347 
Remedies may also be specified by an existing treaty to which the offending state is a 
party. A particular document can detail the “enforcement machinery” that must be  
utilized.348 At current, no international document creates a binding obligation for the right 
to water; however, if one is created, the document must be examined first to see if an 
enforcement structure is included.349 The presence of this standard does not prohibit the 
seeking party from pursuing other remedies under international law.350 
A drawback to the international law approach is that, “In human rights agreements the 
promisee is a state, and the true beneficiary is an individual (and usually a national of the 
violating state),” but the individual does not have standing to bring the claim directly 
against a state.351  The individual is the “incidental beneficiary” of the rights created by 
state parties thereby essentially removing the individual from the process.352  The purpose 
70. This option is time consuming and expensive and rendered unnecessary if other protocols are established and 
properly followed. 
341. See Kidd, supra note 337, at 119, 120–23 (listing the South African constitutional water obligations and 
the subsequent implementing Water Services Act). 
342. See id. at 123–28 (describing cases in South Africa regarding disconnection of water services). 
343. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 583. 
344. See Henkin, supra note 56, at 267 (stating that human rights obligations must be evaluated in light of the 
characteristics of international law). 
345. Jurisdictional issues can arise in relation to any of these options because states must first submit to be 
bound.  BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 571–72, 680–82 (explaining that, in order to fall under ICC jurisdiction, a 
state must be a signatory to the 1998 Rome Statute; in order to fall under ICJ jurisdiction, a state must be a party to 
the Statute of the Court); SHELTON, supra note 335, at 161–62 (stating that jurisdiction in the European Court is 
established through European Community membership). 
346. Imseis, supra note 212, at 132. 
347. Id. at 133.  Although some sanctions are allowed by Comment 15, trade embargoes and sanctions that 
would inhibit a state’s ability to provide basic resources to their people are not.  ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 
10, para. 32. 
348. See Henkin, supra note 56, at 261. 
349. Id. at 260–61. 
350. Id. at 261, 277 n. 11. 
351. See Henkin, supra note 56, at 261, 267–68.  The states, as creators of the laws, are obligors. Id. at 267. 
Obligors have the duty to respect what have been designated as the “human rights” of the citizens in their 
jurisdiction. Id.  This creates the state’s standing to bring a claim. Id.  While lacking standing, individuals and 
NGOs can be instrumental in activating those “remedies in fact.”  Id. at 271. 
352. Id. at 268. 
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of human rights is to induce states to make them effective; not give the right to an 
individual at the international level.353 
If water is implicated in another right, any attempt to enforce the right to water would 
be the same as seeking implementation of the parent right.354  For example, enforcement for 
the right to water might be sought through provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights or the ICCPR which are considered customary international law.355  If a state 
has repeated violations of obligations erga omnes, then they are in breach of international 
law.356  These claims are made by showing a consistent pattern of violating an 
internationally recognized human right, like the right to life.357  Remedies for these types of 
violations can be sought even if the victims were not citizens of the perpetrating state.358 
The concerned state can bring a claim at an agreed upon tribunal, such as the ICJ, assuming 
both parties have submitted to its jurisdiction.359 
If traditional human rights enforcement mechanisms are ineffective, accountability 
can still be achieved in other areas of international law.360  In the case of shared water, the 
Watercourse Convention and other international law principles can be used to ensure that 
the water is allocated in a reasonable and equitable manner.361  Other treaties such as 
CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of a Child can also be used if the state has 
agreed to be bound or if the article sought to be enforced qualifies as customary 
international law. 
Efforts to enforce duties between governments or between a state and a citizen outside 
its jurisdiction pose more difficulties.362 In situations of conflict, the enforcement 
mechanism can emanate from local, humanitarian, or other sources of international law.363 
Regionally, occupied citizens should first evaluate if they can pursue a claim in the local 
court system.364  Internationally, in addition to the principles described above, the Geneva 
Convention provides other alternatives specifically for conflict situations.  Article 146 not 
only encourages local legislation to create internal mechanisms, but also gives jurisdiction 
to the national court of all other contracting parties.365 The presence of a bilateral 
353. See Henkin, supra note 56, at 269. Several years ago, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights proposed an individual complaint mechanism for reporting ICESCR infractions. See Michael J. Dennis & 
David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International 
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 
462 (2004).  The proposal for this system is to create binding decisions based on legal interpretations of the 
ICESCR. Id. at 468. The right to petition “would be broadly available to any individuals or groups who 
themselves claim to be victims of a violation or who act on behalf of alleged victims with their knowledge and 
agreement.”  Id.  This proposal has been under review for many years and the adoption of a new system is not 
likely to happen in the near future.  See id. at 462. 
354. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4. 
355. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 8. 
356. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 537.  The ICJ referred to erga omnes obligations in the Barcelona 
Traction case by differentiating between obligations that are created as a result of diplomatic relations between two 
states and rights that all states hold a legal interest in protecting.  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. 
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3 (Feb. 5). 
357. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 537. 
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 cmt. b (1987). 
359. Id. note 3. 
360. McCaffrey, supra note 12, at 19–20. 
361. Watercourses Convention, supra note 103, art. 6(1). 
362. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
363. See Imseis, supra note 212, at 122–36 (cataloging enforcement under the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
364. See id. at 123–27 (stating the best option for enforcement in the occupied territories is the Israeli High 
Court); see also  BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 290–92 (explaining how domestic and international jurisdiction is 
determined). 
365. Imseis, supra note 212, at 127; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 146. The article grants 
universal jurisdiction, which “refers to the authority of domestic courts and international tribunals to prosecute 
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agreement to which the belligerent occupier is a party is another possible avenue.366 
Another alternative is the appointment of Protecting Powers appointed by the party 
agreement or, if no agreement is made, the International Red Cross can act.367  The purpose 
of the Protecting Powers is to settle disputes between parties that involve Convention 
provisions; the Powers are to be informed of actions taking place in the occupied 
territory.368 
Appropriate remedies for violations of the right to water can vary. A detailed 
discussion of what is suitable is beyond the scope of this Article; however, a few 
suggestions may be helpful to complete the enforcement picture.  The most important goal 
of the right to water is to allow access; therefore, this should be included in any remedy.369 
If water services have been disconnected, service must be reinstated. If no water gathering 
point exists, one must be made available; and if a water utility has been damaged as a result 
of conflict or mistake, it must be repaired.370  Beyond these requirements, victims may also 
be entitled to reparation or compensation as well as a guarantee that water will be available 
in the future.371  The ability of a citizen or a state to seek remedies or reparations for human 
rights violations is a critical part of being entitled to a right.372  Judicial and other remedies 
give strength to existing human rights and will provide the same empowerment to the 
human right to water in the future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Water is critical to the survival of all living things, yet a large portion of the world 
does not have access to sufficient quantities of clean water.373  Lack of water has severe 
health consequences including dehydration and hygiene-related disease.374  One method 
proposed to assist people in gaining access to water is to establish water as a human 
right.375 
Although water was originally argued to be included in the right to life or health, 
recent debates have illustrated the importance of establishing water as an independent 
right.376  Although it can be argued that water is implicit in existing rights, the absence of 
water in these documents creates enforcement problems.377  As an explicitly defined right, 
certain crimes regardless of where the offense occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the nationality of the 
victim.”  Mark P. Scharf & Thomas C. Fischer, Forward to Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, 
and Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 227 (2001). 
366. See Imseis, supra note 212, at 125 (providing the example of the Oslo Accords between Israel and 
Palestine). 
367. Id. at 128; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 181, art. 9. 
368. Imseis, supra note 212, at 128–29.  The Protecting Powers provision has not resulted in the type of 
authority that was envisioned by the Convention drafters and is often completely ignored by parties. Id. at 129. 
369. See generally ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10 (demonstrating the importance of the right to water 
by explaining all of its requirements). 
370. See SHELTON, supra note 335, at 38–39 (“Remedies thus are designed to place an aggrieved party in the 
same position as he or she would have been had no injury occurred.  To achieve this end by holding the wrongdoer 
responsible for providing the remedy . . . can . . . make the victim whole.”). 
371. See ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 55; SHELTON, supra note 335, at 38–39 (listing types of 
remedies that can be levied against a state, including declaratory judgments, compensation, punitive or exemplary 
damages, non-monetary remedies, habeas corpus, and attorney’s fees). 
372. See SHELTON, supra note 335, at 358. 
373. See THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 7. 
374. See id. 
375. See generally Gleick, supra note 3. 
376. See generally id. 
377. See generally id. 
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accountability and structure will be placed on states, and citizens will be afforded more 
rights.378 
Once the right to water has been established and defined, one must then ascertain who 
is responsible for its implementation.  In a general sense, governments are obligated to 
protect the rights of the citizens within their jurisdictions.379  However, in more complex  
situations, such as shared water or economic disparities, governments also have duties 
towards one another and can have an obligation to provide another government with 
water.380  Finally, states also have guidelines regarding treatment of water during and after 
times of conflict.381  These obligations are defined primarily through humanitarian law and 
generally require that citizens of another state involved in the conflict or occupation cannot 
be deprived of water.382 
The duty to provide water cannot lie entirely with government.  As the human right to 
water evolves, the role of individual citizens must also play a part in the realization of these 
goals.383  Although this topic is rarely discussed, some ideas can be deduced from existing 
documents. Human rights provide a mechanism for a citizen to enforce a violation of a 
right against a state; however, this does not negate the responsibilities citizens have towards 
themselves and each other.384  “[I]t is important to bear in mind that human beings are 
responsible for themselves and their own well-being.  Human rights do not automatically 
involve heavy government intervention or imply that individuals can unreservedly demand 
goods and services from the state.”385 
Although Comment 15 does not specifically list the duties of those benefiting from 
the right to water, both the UDHR and ICESCR’s preambles extend obligations to 
individuals by stating that everyone must take progressive steps towards the realization of 
human rights.386  In the realm of water, private citizens must conserve and contribute to 
their access of water before attempting to levy a claim against their government.387 
“Even if people have rights that some of their basic needs be met, it does not follow 
the [sic] everyone is responsible for meeting the need of everyone else.”388  Although the 
government is ultimately responsible for their citizens, individuals should share some of the 
responsibility.389  One way that citizens can contribute is to pay for their access to water.390 
378.  See, e.g., ICESCR Comment 15, supra note 10, at para. 17 (placing immediate obligations upon states 
parties to the Covenant, namely the duties to: (1) exercise the right to water without “discrimination of any kind” in 
accordance with Covenant art. 2, para. 2; and, (2) to take steps toward the realization of the goals outlined in 
Covenant arts. 11, para. 1 & 12). 
379. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
380. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2. 
381. See discussion supra Part III.B, C. 
382. See discussion supra Part III.B, C. 
383. See discussion supra Part IV. 
384. See World Health Org., Water, Health and Human Rights (2001), http://www.who.int/ 
water_sanitation_health/en/humanrights.html. 
385. Id. 
386. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
Comment 15 includes indirect obligations by stating that citizens should not violate the right to water of citizens in 
other countries, but the Article makes the government responsible for ensuring this does not occur. ICESCR 
Comment 15, supra note 10, para. 33. 
387. See World Health Org., supra note 384.  Salman notes that: “The issues surrounding the use and 
protection of water resources are complex, and responsibilities for such issues cannot be placed solely on the 
states.” SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 74. 
388. William N. Nelson, Human Rights and Human Obligations, in XXIII HUMAN RIGHTS NOMOS 292, 
supra note 24. 
389. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 74. 
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This payment should be affordable and based on local economies; however, individual 
contribution is an important part of investing the citizen in their water source.391  Another 
way to involve people in their water resources is by adopting participatory management.392 
The inclusion of the public in water decisions achieves many of the goals postulated in 
social as well as political rights.393 Citizens also need to be equally responsible for the 
protection of their water resources through conservation and safe practices.394  This  
collective action by a community empowers them to be, at least partially, in control of their 
water supply. 
One of the important effects of a rights-based approach is the empowerment of the 
individual.395  It would be counterintuitive to assume that the government is entirely 
responsible for delivery and maintenance of water without any assistance from the people. 
To maintain individual involvement, it appears clear that citizens should be responsible for 
contributing to the cost of delivery or distribution and protection of the resource.  However, 
the extent of their involvement requires further consideration.  Are they also required to 
participate in the water amendment or distribution processes?  Is their involvement required 
or voluntary and do any enforcement mechanisms exist that could require their 
participation?  Other questions also remain unanswered such as the right of a citizen of one 
state to bring a claim against the government of another state.  This paper focused primarily 
on the ability of one government to require the assistance of a neighboring government. 
However, an extension of this, if this type of human rights application is possible, may be 
to give a citizen standing to bring a claim on his own behalf. This outcome would be 
similar to the developments of war crimes tribunals making a government accountable to 
anyone who is injured by its actions.  Although, all the details have yet to be discovered, it 
is clear that with citizens working together with their governments, the human right to 
water can be realized and reach the status of customary international law that it deserves. 
390. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 32.  Monetary contributions to the water system, either through 
taxes or fees, will help maintain an effective system and preserve the right for the larger group.  See Nelson, supra 
note 388, at 292. 
391. See THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 32. 
392. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 9, at 75. 
393. Id. 
394. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1, at 32. 
395. See id. at 10. 
